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Abstract 
 Agriculture is argued to be one of our most critical infrastructures and is vital to 
human health and survivability.  Agriculture is economically important in Virginia as it 
provides over 350,000 jobs and generates $55 billion annually (Virginia Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services).  This high criticality lends to significant areas of 
vulnerability in each sector of agriculture.  Rockingham County is of particular importance as 
the top agriculturally producing county in the state and is ranked 5th in the nation for 
poultry sales (2007 Census of Agriculture).  The desire to uphold this high production calls 
for a need to better understand what vulnerabilities threaten productivity.  An examination 
was conducted to assess the ability to respond to and recover from any threat on this 
industry. 
      This research employs an all hazard approach which examines intentional attacks of 
both a criminal and terrorist nature.  Three specific areas address these concerns.  First, the 
Potential Threat Elements which may attack the poultry industry, and the industry 
vulnerabilities they may find most attractive, are examined.  Second, vulnerabilities of the 
poultry farms where primary grow operations take place are analyzed.  Third, the capability 
of Rockingham County Fire Rescue to respond to an agricultural incident is discussed.  
      The Animal Liberation Front was identified as the greatest threat to the industry.  
Several areas of vulnerability were reported including industry representatives who tend to 
be resistant to help because they believe it will increase regulation and ultimately their cost of 
production.  Finally, the personnel of Rockingham County Fire Rescue have acknowledged a 
need for more agricultural incident training including annual exercises to help the agency to 
prepare for incidents involving poultry as well as other aspects of agriculture.  
Introduction 
Agricultural security is one of the most important topics in security and 
counterterrorism today.  “Agroterrorism is the deliberate tampering with and/or 
contamination of the food supply with the intent of adversely affecting the social, economic, 
physical, and psychological well-being of society”  (Levin 2005).  Its ease of implementation 
and potential for massive impacts makes it attractive to domestic and foreign terrorists 
resulting in a great threat to our communities.  Agriculture has been named one of the most 
vulnerability industries for terrorist activity (NCBRT 2001, 3-15).  Former Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson said “I, for the life of me, cannot 
understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply, because it is so easy to do” 
(Tommy Thompson 2004).   
Threats fall into in three categories:  natural, accidental, and intentional.  Natural 
cases are those which involve no human input and typically result in an infectious disease 
which spreads throughout a population.  An accidental case is similar, but involves some 
human input.  This human error could cause a release of an infectious disease to a 
population.  Intentional cases can be classified as criminal or terrorist.  A criminal 
occurrence has no political or social motivation and likely would be motivated by some other 
personal gain.  On the contrary, terrorism involves some political or social motive.   
The FBI definition of terrorism states that terrorism involves some “violation of 
criminal laws of the United States or of any state” which “appear to be intended to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence policy of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping” (Weapons of Mass Destruction, PD3).  All 
terrorism incidents are criminal in nature, but criminal incidents are not necessarily terrorism 
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unless they involve this political or social motive.  This study focuses on intentional attacks 
on agriculture, with an emphasis on those with terrorist motive.    
Agriculture is a lucrative target for a multitude of reasons.  Low security on farms 
makes agriculture an easier target than many traditional targets.  Most terrorists aim to carry 
out their attack while escaping undetected.  Farms in America have little security or 
surveillance when compared to traditional public and private targets.  Farms are considered a 
“soft target” with their limited areas of security and ease of access.  A terrorist could easily 
access an agricultural facility at night to carry out their attack and be clear of the area before 
they are noticed.  Furthermore, depending upon the agent they use, delayed biological effects 
could give the terrorist ample time to flee.  Agriculture may also be an attractive target to 
those who do not desire to carry out an attack which may be overtly lethal to humans.  This 
is especially true for those who want to show their willingness to kill, but are reluctant to 
cause human casualties.  Some are more likely to carry out their attacks on animals in fear of 
social, religious, or civilian retaliation if they were to cause human casualties (Moats 2007, 1-
4).   
Agriculture incidents include targets from the “Farm-to-Fork.”  This means that an 
attack on any sector within this chain can be considered an agriculture incident.  For 
instance, an attack on crops or animals on a farm qualifies.  An attack on a restaurant salad 
bar also qualifies under this definition.  The following figure illustrates the sectors of this 
chain which are vulnerable to attack and how an attack may propagate through the chain 
(Figure 1).  In the first part of the chain, a pathogen or toxin can be introduced directly into 
a crop or animal population.  These toxins or pathogens can then be transferred from crops 
by consumption from animals.  Then, infected crops and animals may be introduced into the 
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domestic food supply.  The toxin or disease (in this case zoonotic) can then be passed on to 
the public through the food supply. 
 
Figure 1. Demonstrates Disease Or Toxin Propagation Throughout The 
Farm-To-Fork Theory Of Agricultural Terrorism (Wefald 1999, 7). 
Because of the importance and ease of access to the agricultural system, many 
agencies have reported agriculture to be one of the most vulnerable and critical 
infrastructures of our time.  The National Academy of Sciences has supported this notion 
through the National Research Council.  This council has found that “…because of its size 
and complexity, the U.S. food and agriculture system is vulnerable to deliberate attacks, 
particularly with foreign diseases that do not now occur domestically” (National Research 
Council 2002).   
System complexity is one of the major factors in vulnerability.  The agriculture 
system has been defined as one of the most complicated supply chain systems around.  This 
system was designed to produce a large amount of high quality product at a low cost; this 
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system was not designed to be protected from intentional contamination (Hennessey 2010, 
6). 
Additionally, the National Research Council reports that even a simple threat on the 
agricultural system, short of any action, can have a significant negative economic impact.  
These actions could be considered an act of terrorism.  A plausible threat to attack the food 
supply has the potential to damage our economy as well as reduce the public’s trust in our 
ability to protect this infrastructure.  This psychological impact is imposed by the public’s 
perception that its government cannot protect its food supply (The National Academy of 
Sciences 2002).  
Agriculture is a great economic asset to local, state, and national economies in the 
United States.  Additionally, agriculture is one of the largest consumers of biotechnology in 
America.  One of the top terrorist motives is to break the infrastructure of a nation through 
economic collapse.  Attacking agriculture is a prime means.  Low security in the second layer 
of agriculture (individual farms) makes an attack rather easy at this level.  Since all levels of 
agriculture are interconnected, if a lower layer of the agricultural chain is attacked, an 
economic ripple effect would cascade throughout the entire system.  It is understood that 
attacking an individual farm may not be detrimental to the entire system, but if a network of 
farms is attacked, the ripple effect could have national level consequences.  This is especially 
dangerous with terrorist motive as terrorists tend to seek “multiple incident” type attacks.  
That being said, any individual attack should not be assumed isolated and shall not be passed 
off as diminutive (Moats 2007, 5-6). 
Agriculture exports will also experience severe effects from an agricultural incident.  
In 2003 the United States experienced their first case of mad cow disease (Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalitis- BSE) in Washington State.  After this outbreak, Japan, one of the 
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top importers of US beef, halted all beef imports from the US.  This brought international 
attention to the US beef industry and US exports declined nearly in half (Mitchell 2004).  
Japan did continue trade with the US but implemented strict trade agreements; however in 
2006 they reinstated the import ban when the US broke these trade restrictions on a single 
shipment.  Sources report billions lost in the cattle industry from this event.  These 
cascading losses were felt all the way down to individual growers and feeders.  A major 
natural, accidental, or intentional outbreak in the US agriculture system would likely cause 
similar impacts on exports (Marshall 2006).  
Foreign Animal Diseases (FADs) are those diseases which are believed to be absent 
from the United States.  These diseases may have been endemic in the past; however 
scientists now believe every case has been eradicated in the United States.  There are a host 
of reasons why an FAD may become present in the United States.  A reason considered by 
this research is the intentional introduction by a criminal or terrorist.  An FAD is an 
excellent case-in-point which illustrates the dangers of the ripple effect described above.   
If a FAD was introduced into a population, the devastation could be extraordinary.  
An FAD outbreak would likely cascade throughout all five layers of agriculture causing 
widespread desolation.  At the local farm, an FAD could cause widespread death of those 
infected.  Additionally, with the importance of not allowing the FAD to become endemic in 
the United States, those animals exposed to the disease would also need to be destroyed 
(culled).  Widespread death would cause economic and psychological turmoil on the farm 
and local community.  In the 2001 outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in Europe 
(a disease that’s considered a FAD in the United States) at least 60 farmers committed 
suicide after they were required to cull their entire population (Van Wie 2009).  These effects 
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would also be felt in layers three and four of agriculture.  First, grain and feed producers rely 
on product demand from highly productive farms.  As farms begin to lose animals to an 
FAD, grain and feed producers will begin to lose customers.  As with the farms, grain and 
feed businesses will likely close.  These effects will eventually be felt at layer five of 
agriculture, directly affecting the consumer.  As the demand for meat increases the cost of 
the meat will also spike until the supply is exhausted.  Once exhausted, wholesaler profit will 
also be severely diminished, causing many wholesalers to go under.  Finally, retailers would 
pass their lost profits onto the customers, causing the price of meat to rise even further.  In 
the 2001 FMD natural outbreak in Europe cost at least $16 billion.  This was one of the 
most expensive events in Europe’s history, second to WWII (Van Wie 2009).   While this 
example represents major outbreak, the turmoil is not that farfetched for a terrorist attack if 
the perpetrators have a good understanding of the agricultural industry and the disease they 
use. 
This thesis involves agricultural incidents (including agroterrorism) with a focus on 
the poultry industry in Rockingham County, Virginia.  Agriculture is the heart of 
productivity in the Commonwealth of Virginia.  Most of our primary production, and much 
of the state’s economic wealth, comes from the hard work of individual farming families 
across the Commonwealth.  The importance of agriculture, along with low security on farms 
and in the agricultural industry, makes agriculture a significant target for attack.    
 There are five layers of the agriculture industry, all at risk of attack.  The first layer is 
the most basic layer which is on individual farms.  In layer 1 you look at specific organisms 
on a farm (i.e. chicken, cow etc.).  Layer 1 is the basic building block for the entire 
agricultural industry.  Layer 2 encompasses the farm as a whole, including the interaction of 
these organisms on the farm and their interconnectivity with agricultural production.  Layer 
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3 involves the interaction of farms in local agricultural communities.  This layer includes 
farms located in the same geographic region.  In this layer, a web of support among local 
agricultural communities is introduced.  This can include feed production, farm bureaus, 
fertilizer and insecticide manufacturing, farm implement manufacturing (tractors, hay bailers, 
wagons etc.) which support the local agricultural community.  Layer 4 brings these local 
agricultural communities together at the national level.  This level also includes ancillary 
industries to the agricultural communities (i.e. sellers, retailers, federal government and 
contractors).  Layer 5 addresses the international agricultural market including agricultural 
exports.  All five layers build upon each other to form a strong, thriving agricultural 
community which exports billions in agricultural products annually (Moats 2007, 6-9). 
Agriculture is Virginia’s largest and most productive industry.  The importance of 
agriculture to the commonwealth is astonishing.  In Virginia, the agricultural industry 
provides more than 357,000 jobs and generates revenue of $55 billion annually (Virginia 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services).  Rockingham County has almost 2,000 
farms with over 230,000 acres in farmland (Commonwealth of Virginia 2008). 
This study focuses on the poultry industry.  The industry is one of the top thriving 
industries in the commonwealth.  Virginia ranks 9th in the country for broiler production 
with a value of $563.2 million in 2008.  Total broiler production was around 1.25 billion 
pounds in 2008.  Virginia also has a thriving egg production with 726 million eggs produced 
in 2008 (Commonwealth of Virginia 2008).  
 Rockingham County has been selected for this study as it is a highly economically 
productive agricultural county in the Commonwealth of Virginia.  Rockingham County has 
long been ranked 1st in the state for profits from agricultural products (2007 Census of 
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Agriculture).  Additionally, Rockingham County has been nicknamed the “turkey capital of 
Virginia” because it also has the most productive poultry industry in the state.  Rockingham 
County’s poultry production has nationwide impacts as it ranks 5th in the nation for value of 
poultry sales (2007 Census of Agriculture). 
 The poultry industry is responsible for raising birds (chickens, turkeys, ducks, and 
geese) for meat and egg production.  In Rockingham County the poultry industry is focused 
on chicken and turkey for meat.  Chicken are the primary production bird in the poultry 
industry.  Historically, chickens were the first animal to be confined in large numbers within 
automated systems for meat and egg production.  The successful production of chicken 
meat and eggs led to a thriving poultry industry in the United States.  In the 20th century the 
United States poultry industry became a model for agricultural industries globally (Davis 
2009, 6-10).   
There are two genetic types of chickens used in the poultry industry:  broiler birds 
for meat production and laying hens for egg production.  These large production industries 
are controlled by private companies in a “vertical integration system” which was established 
post World War II.   This vertical system begins with producer companies which own all 
production sectors within the poultry industry.  These production sectors include the birds, 
hatcheries, feed mills, transportation services, medications, slaughter plants, final processing 
facilities, and facilitation of buyer delivery.  These producer companies will contract with 
small farms to carry out many of these functions.  There are over 25,000 farms in the United 
States contracted to support the poultry industry.  The poultry farmers that work these farms 
are commonly known as growers.  The parent company provides growers with birds which 
the growers are responsible for raising.  The growers supply the land, housing, and 
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equipment for the birds.  They also look after the birds providing them with food, 
medication, and will dispose of their waste (Davis 2009, 6-10).             
While agricultural incidents primarily involve pathogens which infect farm animals, 
one must not ignore traditional weapons of mass destruction.  Farm animals are kept 
outdoors with little security and often no shelter.  It wouldn’t be difficult to use traditional 
weapons such as conventional (explosives), radiological, or even nuclear weapons.  The 
likelihood of a nuclear or radiological attack against agriculture is very low.  An attack of this 
magnitude would be overkill since much cheaper and simpler means are available.  
Additionally, these weapons are difficult to acquire.  The primary threat to agriculture is 
considered to be chemical and biological weapons.   
Environmental conditions can make it difficult for some of these agents to be 
effective.  The effectiveness of chemical agents usually depends upon their ability to attack 
the most dangerous route of entry- inhalation.  Animals are either kept outdoors or indoors 
where systems are in place to rapidly exchange the air.  These environmental conditions 
make it difficult to attack animals via inhalation.  Additionally, the amount of chemical 
required to affect a larger, heavier animal would be much greater than that of a human.  
Because of the difficulty of dissemination, and the amount of agent required to attack, 
chemical agents are not a strong candidate for agriculture (Moats 2007, 14-17). 
The same environmental difficulties apply to biological agents.  However if 
dissemination is successful, biological agents would be much more effective against 
agriculture.  The natural curiosity of animals allows for much lower tech dissemination than 
would be required to infect humans.  Additionally, biological agents are cheaper, more lethal, 
and many carry a contagious factor which makes them a better option for agricultural attack.  
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Biological agents are easier to obtain due to their wide natural occurrence and use in 
laboratories for basic research.  Unlike chemical agents which remain contained to the area 
of release, biological agents can proliferate exponentially through populations (Wefald 1999, 
3).  Because of their ease of production and dispersion, biological agents are the likely agent 
of choice for attackers (NCBRT 2007, 3-25). 
There are a wide range of pathogens which may be used against agriculture including 
bacteria, viruses, toxins, and some fungal agents.  Several bacterial agents are likely 
candidates for an agriculture attack.  For example, “Exotic New Castle Disease” affects 
poultry and can simply be disseminated by bringing infectious fluids into contact with 
healthy birds.  This disease has higher mortality rates in young and old populations, and has 
the possibility of being transmitted to humans.  Highly pathogenic strains of Avian Influenza 
are also a biological source which could pose a threat to the poultry industry.  This pathogen 
could have mortality rates up to 100%.  These two pathogenic biological agents are examples 
of a large selection of agents, in addition to the traditional WMD biological agents, which 
may be used against agriculture (Moats 2007, 17-28). 
In the spring of 2002, Rockingham County, VA experienced a natural outbreak of 
Avian Influenza (AIV) H7N2 Virus.  This infection spread to 197 farms resulting in the 
death (natural and culled) of over 4.7 million turkey and chickens (Akey 2003, 1099).  This 
natural outbreak serves as an excellent example of a poultry disease which could have 
massive implications if used as a bioweapon. 
The first case of AIV was found in a flock of turkeys from North Carolina on 
February 28th, 2002.  This case was identified through a routine surveillance program in 
Virginia.  On March 7th the next case appeared in a 10-house company breeder farm in the 
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eastern portion of Rockingham County, VA.  These birds were displaying common signs 
and symptoms of AIV and tested positively for AIV on March 7th.  On the initial test the 
birds returned a negative result.  However, on a subsequent test on March 11th they tested 
strongly positive for AIV antibodies.  This H7N2 virus was determined to be nearly identical 
to previous cases found in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and West 
Virginia.  The breeder voluntarily depopulated his flock on March 15th, eight days after the 
symptoms appeared (Akey 2003, 1100). 
Ring testing was immediately conducted within a 2 mile radius of the index farm.  
Ring testing is a technique used where veterinary personnel start at the index farm (the 
source) and begin testing consecutively in rings out from this farm.  They continue to test 
outward from the source until they determine they have reached a buffer zone where they 
believe there are no organisms which have been exposed.  This ring testing proved that the 
AIV was spreading quickly throughout the vast poultry population in Rockingham County.   
On March 18th birds on a secondary farm, which were received from the index farm 
the day before symptoms appeared, tested positive for AIV.  During the next two days three 
additional farms had turkeys which tested positive for AIV.  Over a period of three weeks 
the AIV spread to neighboring counties with cases doubling weekly (Figure 2).  A peak 
occurred in May 2002 and the final new case of AIV was identified on July 2nd.  The Virginia 
State Veterinarians office had issued orders for the quarantine and depopulation of nearly 5 
million birds which were affected (Akey 2003, 1101). 
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Figure 2.  Avian Influenza Virus Positively Identified Flocks in the 
Shenandoah Valley Virginia from March 3rd, 2002 to July 15th, 2002 (Akey 2003, 1101). 
 While 197 farms were affected in six counties, these numbers could have been much 
higher.  There were 700-800 poultry farms in the area that were at risk of infection.  With 
early recognition and quick vaccination an Avian Influenza Task Force was able to prevent a 
greater spread.  This case lasted approximately four months which was noted as a short 
turnaround and a successful mitigation from the community.  This four month outbreak was 
estimated to have cost millions to the businesses involved (Table 1).  The total estimated 
cost is as follows (Akey 2003, 1103). 
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Table 1.  Avian Influenza Virus Economic Impact in the Shenandoah Valley  
Virginia 2002 (Akey 2003, 1103). 
Poultry Industry/Growers $130 million (lost revenue) 
USDA Avian Influenza Task Force $14 million 
Commonwealth of Virginia $1 million 
Indemnity Claims for market value of flocks ordered 
destroyed (including cost of cleaning/disinfecting) 
$67 million 
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST $212 million 
 
 This natural outbreak costs over $200 million and drew massive resources from both 
the state and federal governments for a period of four months.  The costs of an intentional 
attack could be much higher.  The AIV case study illustrates mitigation techniques used to 
detect and control disease outbreaks.  A terrorist could use university and outside 
publications to study these mitigation techniques and determine means of circumventing 
them.  The USDA and Commonwealth of Virginia had a strong knowledgebase of AIV and 
were relatively prepared for this outbreak.  However, both are much less prepared for 
Foreign Animal Diseases, which would be the vector of choice for an attacker.   
 Identifying that an agricultural incident has occurred is not an easy task.  Agricultural 
incidents could be mistaken for a multitude of accidents or naturally occurring diseases.  It is 
important to know indicators of an agricultural incident.  These indicators include an 
unusual number of sick or dying animals, sometimes out of the normal illness season, and 
presence of a disease not endemic to that region.  Physical evidence may also be available 
including signs of forced entry, abandoned dissemination devices, and unscheduled dusting 
(especially during nighttime hours).  These indicators, among a much larger list, prove the 
importance of noticing something is out of place as early as possible (FDA, FBI, USDA 
2008). 
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  As soon as there is suspicion of an agricultural incident arises, scene control needs 
to be established.  The responsibility for scene control lies within local law enforcement.  If 
necessary, law enforcement can reach out to fire rescue and even the National Guard for 
larger incidents.  The most important factor in scene control is controlling what goes on and 
off the affected farm.  Only one entrance should be used, and all persons/equipment must 
be logged when entering or exiting.  The movement of all animals must also be halted to 
prevent the spread of disease.  Controlling the movement of animals is a factor in biosecurity 
measures.  This is especially dangerous with highly contagious diseases.  Biosecurity 
measures are put in place so the disease does not spread to other populations.  In the 2001 
FMD outbreak in Europe it was estimated the disease spread nearly 500 square miles a day 
(Van Wie 2009).  This is especially important when a zoonotic disease is suspect as these 
diseases may be transmitted to humans as well (Moats 2007, 71-75). 
The National Animal Health Emergency Response Plan (USDA- Animal Plant 
Health Inspection Service or APHIS) has generated a process for handling the initial 
response to animal health emergencies.  When a farmer identifies a possible disease has 
emerged, he will contact his local veterinarian.  If the local veterinarian identifies a disease 
anomaly that appears suspicious for any reason, they will contact a state veterinarian, or 
APHIS who will contact the Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC).  If a Foreign Animal 
Disease is suspected, the AVIC will contact a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician 
(FADD).  The FADD will then acquire samples from the suspect animal and place the 
premises on quarantine.  Depending upon the disease type and distribution, the FADD may 
quarantine the neighboring farms as well.  The FADD will send the samples of to the lab for 
confirmed diagnosis and may activate the state animal emergency response plan.  If the FAD 
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is confirmed, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) will announce the 
confirmed cause and take control of the eradication efforts (Moats 2007, 94-96).  
 If terrorism is suspected, the FBI and USDA- Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) will lead the investigative efforts under the guidance of the National Framework 
Emergency Support Function (ESF) #11.  ESF #11 provides guidance for agricultural and 
natural resource emergencies.  Under this ESF, the USDA-OIG leads the investigative 
efforts with the support of other federal and state agencies, if the event is assumed to be 
solely criminal.  It is the duty of the FBI to determine if the event is considered terrorism 
and if so, to take control of the investigation.  Under ESF #11, APHIS has the responsibility 
to support mitigation and recovery efforts by providing disease inspection, quarantine, 
fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, extermination, and carcass disposal.  Additionally, 
APHIS will enforce interstate quarantines if the disease spread is believed to have crossed 
state lines.  ESF #11 only provides guidance for which federal agencies hold responsibilities, 
but encourages support from state, local, and private resources   (Moats 2007, 130-134).  
As defined by the ESF #11, APHIS has the responsibility for many of the operations 
following an animal health emergency.  Some of their most important mitigation 
responsibilities include surveillance, containment, euthanasia/depopulation, and cleaning.  
APHIS veterinarians conduct surveillance through the entire incident monitoring for disease 
spread.  They will monitor for disease spread throughout the livestock population, and 
human population if a zoonotic disease is suspected.  APHIS will also oversee the 
eradication of the disease, which may call for euthanasia of the animals.  Euthanasia is only 
performed by trained teams with techniques which have been approved by the agricultural 
community and defined as humane.  These humane options include narcotics, gas 
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asphyxiation, foam suffocation etc.  Finally, APHIS will oversee the cleaning and disinfecting 
of equipment and personnel to prevent the spread of disease.  These teams contain trained 
personnel with representatives from:  veterinarian, epidemiology, environmental, and 
hazardous material teams (Moats 2007, 143). 
As stated above, the initial response will be conducted by local authorities.  These 
authorities will have the best understanding of the area and the local agricultural operations.  
However, in rural agricultural communities, the local first responders often lack funding and 
training to prepare themselves for an agricultural emergency.  For example:  volunteer fire 
departments usually have inconsistent training and older equipment which may not be 
adequate to handle a WMD attack on agriculture.  While local authorities are a great asset in 
initial response, state and federal assistance will undoubtedly be necessary.   
Because of the growing threat of agricultural incidents and the importance of the 
poultry industry in Rockingham County, this study will test the vulnerability of the industry 
in this county.  This assessment will be conducted in three phases.  The first phase will 
utilize a threat and vulnerability assessment of the poultry industry.  Several processing 
plants and feed mills have been selected to conduct this assessment which was created by the 
U.S. Department of Justice  (DOJ).  In respect of security privacy, the names of the 
companies will not be used in this report.  This assessment was intended specifically for 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) incidents, however this 
assessment will be adapted to consider all intentional hazards against the industry.  The 
second phase will test the vulnerability of several grower’s (contracted by the companies 
tested in phase 1) operations and farms.  Finally, a capability assessment will be conducted to 
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test the readiness of Rockingham County Fire and Rescue to respond to an agricultural 
incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Methods 
Phase 1:  Threat and Vulnerability Assessment- Industry 
 This assessment is borrowed from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).  The 
assessment consists of two areas for evaluation:  threats and vulnerabilities.  The threat 
assessment reviews intelligence information about individuals or groups which may pose a 
threat to a specified jurisdiction (Incident Command 2008, TAA19).       
The threat assessment begins with the identification of Potential Threat Elements 
(PTEs).  These PTEs are determined using a Department of Defense (DOD) threat analysis 
methodology and are defined by:  “Any group or individual in which there are allegations or 
information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically using 
CBRNE hazards, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, 
possibly political or social in nature.”  It is noted that CBRNE hazards are those which have 
been defined as Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Explosives which have been, 
or may be, weaponized (Incident Command 2008, TAA18).  
Four PTEs have been selected for this assessment.  The first PTE is the People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA).  This organization is very active in the animal 
agricultural industry, however is not deemed a violent threat.  This PTE is included in the 
assessment as a baseline for comparison for our more violent organizations.  The second 
PTE is the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).  This too is an active organization in the animal 
agriculture industry; however they practice more violent activities and are considered a 
domestic terrorist.  ALF is expected to be our highest risk PTE.  The next PTE is Islamic 
extremism.  Al Qaeda is the focus under this PTE and is defined as the international 
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terrorist.  Finally, Disgruntled Employees are considered a threat to the agricultural industry.  
This PTE assumes no association with any other organization and serves as our lone 
offender.  These four PTEs have been selected as representative of violent and non-violent 
entities both domestic and abroad.   
 An intelligence acquisition process is necessary to develop the PTEs.  The US 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Incident Command: Capabilities Actions and Response 
Planning manual stresses the importance of this process as the foundation of this threat 
assessment.  This manual recommends collection of law enforcement information and 
government/military intelligence for the development of the intelligence profile for each 
PTE.  Due to the classified nature of much of this information, the intelligence gathering 
process for this assessment was conducted with collection of research, primary literature, 
and news sources readily available to the public.   
 The Department of Justice Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit identifies five 
threat factors (Table 2) which are used to rate each PTE.  The DOJ assessment looks at 
vulnerabilities specifically related to intentional incidents involving CBRNE materials.  While 
this assessment does acknowledge CBRNE attacks in an agricultural setting, these threats are 
analyzed as they relate to all-hazards.  (Incident Command 2008, TAA19-20). 
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Table 2.  Potential Threat Element Factors (Incident Command 2008, TAA19-20) 
Existence The PTE is present in the specified jurisdiction, or has the potential for 
easy access to the jurisdiction.  The criminal/terrorist element must exist 
with allegations that this PTE may unlawfully use force or violence 
against people or property. 
History The PTE has a violent criminal history or terrorist activity. 
Intentions The PTE has credible sources which report their intentions to use 
threats, force, or violent acts against the jurisdiction. 
CBRNE 
Capability 
The PTE has credible sources which report they have the training, skills, 
and financial means or access to resources necessary to develop or 
purchase CBRNE hazards.  This capability is specified in which they 
possess a quantity or potency sufficient to produce mass casualties. 
Targeting The PTE has credible sources which report its preparations for criminal 
activity directed at targets identified within the jurisdiction.  
 
 Each threat factor carries a specific score if the PTE meets the requirements for that 
category.  These scores are independent of severity for each factor; either the PTE receives 
the full score or no score at all.  The sum of all of the threat factor scores gives the overall 
Threat Level.  The following values will be assigned to each PTE if they meet the 
requirements as defined above in each category:  existence-1; history-1; intention-2; 
capability-2; targeting-4.  The unique category value will be assigned if the PTE meets the 
threat factor and a 0 will be assigned if they do not.    The threat level is then calculated on a 
scale of 1-10 with 10 being the highest threat level.  The highest Threat Level of all the PTEs 
will serve as the Jurisdiction Threat Level.  This value will then be used in the vulnerability 
part of the assessment.  
 Once the PTEs are defined and a Jurisdiction Threat Level is established, a 
vulnerability assessment will be conducted for the jurisdiction.  This vulnerability assessment 
will look at the target attractiveness, its vulnerability, and the potential impact on the 
community if it was attacked.  Seven areas will be reviewed in the vulnerability assessment in 
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accordance to the US DOJ assessment:  Level of Visibility, Criticality of Target Site, Value of 
Target, Access to Target, Target Threat of Hazard, Target Site Population Capacity, and the 
Potential for Mass Casualties.  Each facility will receive a score in each of these categories as 
described below (Incident Command 2008, TA20-21). 
 Level of Visibility.  This vulnerability category addresses how well known the target 
is in the community (Table 3).  The target may be classified (essentially invisible to general 
public) or may be a well known.  A PTE will be able to slide into an open, well-known 
building better than one whose identity is classified.  The scoring is defined by the following 
(Incident Command 2008, TA21). 
Table 3.  Vulnerability Assessment: Level of Visibility Factors  
(Incident Command 2008, TA21). 
Level of Visibility Score 
Addresses the potential awareness target existence  
Invisible (location classified) 0 
Very Low Visibility (probably not aware of existence) 1 
Low Visibility (existence is probably not well known) 2 
Medium Visibility (existence is probably known) 3 
High Visibility (existence is well known) 4 
Very High Visibility (existence is obvious) 5 
 
 Criticality of Target Site.  This criterion measures the impact of loss to the 
community if the target were attacked (Table 4).  Because these poultry facilities are large 
employers in Rockingham County the loss on the local community would be greater than 
that on a national level.  This area takes into account the targets usefulness to the 
community, economy, and government.  The scoring is defined by the following (Incident 
Command 2008, TA22): 
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Table 4.  Vulnerability Assessment: Criticality Factors  
(Incident Command 2008, TA22). 
Criticality of Target Site Score 
Describes the asset’s usefulness to the population, economy, or government 
and whether the asset is critical to the community of basic community 
infrastructure and the impact of loss 
 
Not Useful (Loss would have no impact on community) 0 
Somewhat Useful (Loss would be noticeable but have little impact on community) 1 
Moderately Useful (Loss would inconvenience some but have a short recovery) 2 
Significantly Useful (Loss would result in economic damages, loss of life, or a long 
recovery period) 
3 
Highly Useful (Loss would result in severe damage to community, a longer recovery 
period, and/or large financial losses; large impact on population) 
4 
Critical (Loss would be devastating to community; a long recovery period; severe 
impact on population) 
5 
 
 Value of the Target.  This criterion considers how attractive a target is to a PTE 
(Table 5).  This is determined by the facility’s function, symbolic importance, or both.  The 
monetary value of the target can also increase its attractiveness to a PTE.  The more 
important a facility is, the more attractive it is to the PTE.  The more attractive the facility is 
the higher rating it should receive.  The scoring is defined by the following (Incident 
Command 2008, TA23):  
Table 5.  Vulnerability Assessment: Target Value (Incident Command 2008, TA23). 
Value of Target Score 
Evaluates the usefulness of the target to serve the means of the potential 
threat elements identified in the threat assessment 
 
None  0 
Very Low 1 
Low 2 
Medium 3 
High 4 
Very High Visibility 5 
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 Access to the Target.  This criterion looks at several security features of the facility 
that may slow or hinder a PTE’s attack (Table 6).  It looks at fencing, physical security, 
controlled facility access, protected air sources, and the distance at which visitors can park 
from the building.  All of these factors affect the PTE’s ease of carrying out an attack.  The 
scoring is defined by the following (Incident Command 2008, TA25): 
Table 6.  Vulnerability Assessment: Target Access (Incident Command 2008, TA25). 
Access to the Target Score 
Addresses ease of access to the target  
Fenced, guarded, protected air;  controlled access by pass only;  no vehicle parking 
within 125 feet 
0 
Guarded/protected air;  controlled access of visitors and non-staff personnel; no 
parking within 125 feet 
1 
Protected air; controlled access of visitors and non-staff; no unauthorized vehicle 
parking within 125 feet 
2 
Unprotected air; Controlled access of visitors; no unauthorized vehicle parking within 
125 feet 
3 
Unprotected air; open access to all personnel; no unauthorized parking within 125 feet 4 
Unprotected air;  open access to all personnel; vehicle parking within 125 feet 5 
 
 Target Threat of Hazard.  This criterion looks specifically at the presence of 
CBRNE materials at the facility (Table 7).  It determines if CBRNE materials are on 
location, if their access is controlled, and if there is enough that could be used in attack.  
PTEs will evaluate the presence of CBRNE materials on location to assist in their attack.  
These materials could be used as the primary weapon or used as an auxiliary weapon to their 
initial attack.  The scoring is defined by the following (Incident Command 2008, TA26):   
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Table 7.  Vulnerability Assessment: Target CBRNE Threat  
(Incident Command 2008, TA26). 
Target Threat of Hazard Score 
Assesses the presence of CBRNE materials in quantities that could be useful as 
weapons if they came under control of the potential threat elements 
 
No CBRNE material present 0 
CBRNE material present moderate quantities under positive control in secure 
locations 
1 
CBRNE materials present in moderate quantities and controlled 2 
Major concentrations of CBRNE materials that have established control features and 
are secured in the site 
3 
Major concentrations of CBRNE materials that have moderate control 4 
Major concentrations of CBNRE materials accessible to non-staff personnel 5 
 
 Target Site Population Capacity.  This criterion begins to look at the direct impact 
on the company and its employees if attacked (Table 8).  A PTE will look at facility capacity 
when determining if they will attack.  PTEs prefer facilities with a large number of victims, 
so a higher target population capacity receives a higher rating.  The scoring is defined by the 
following (Incident Command 2008, TA27):  
Table 8.  Vulnerability Assessment: Target Population  
(Incident Command 2008, TA27). 
Target Site Population Capacity Score 
Maximum number of individuals at the potential target site at any given time  
0 to 100 0 
101 to 250 1 
251 to 500 2 
501 to 1,000 3 
1,001 to 5,000 4 
Greater than 5,000 5 
 
 Potential for Mass Casualty.  This criterion looks at the direct impact on the 
community (Table 9).  It evaluates the facility location in relation to the existing population 
in the community.  Several factors are involved when looking at the destruction path from a 
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facility that is attacked.  It is good to have an understanding of the population number of the 
surrounding area to understand the potential for mass casualty if a large CBRNE weapon is 
used.  The scoring is defined by the following (Incident Command 2008, TA28):   
Table 9.  Vulnerability Assessment: Mass Casualty (Incident Command 2008, TA28). 
Potential for Mass Casualty Score 
Ranges indicate inhabitants within a one mile radius of a site  
0 to 100 0 
101 to 250 1 
251 to 500 2 
501 to 1,000 3 
1,001 to 5,000 4 
Greater than 5,000 5 
 
 Five facilities in Rockingham County have been selected for this vulnerability 
assessment.  For industry privacy and security these facilities will not be named, nor will their 
location be disclosed.  First, two poultry processing plants have been selected.  These 
facilities will be referred to as Processing Plant 1 and 2 (P1, P2).  Three feed mills have also 
been selected.  These facilities will be referred to as Feed Mill 1, 2, and 3 (F1, F2, F3). 
 Each facility will receive a total vulnerability rating score from 0-35.  A facility which 
is the least vulnerable will score 0 and the facility which is the most vulnerable will score 35.  
A Target Vulnerability Rating conversion will reduce some of the subjectivity from the 
vulnerability assessment process (Table 10).  The vulnerability score will correspond to a 
Target Vulnerability Rating as defined by the following (Incident Command 2008, TA40): 
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Table 10.  Vulnerability Assessment: Target Vulnerability Rating Scale  
(Incident Command 2008, TA40). 
Target Vulnerability  
Assessment Key 
Target Vulnerability Rating 
TOTAL SCORE RATING VALUE 
0 to 2 1 
3 to 5 2 
6 to 8 3 
9 to 11 4 
12 to 14 5 
15 to 17 6 
18 to 20 7 
21 to 23 8 
24 to 26 9 
27 to 29 10 
30 to 32 11 
33 to 35 12 
 
 The highest Individual Target Vulnerability Rating assessed will become the 
Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating.  This rating is based on of the most vulnerable facility as 
the “worst case scenario.”  Finally, the Jurisdiction Risk Rating is determined using this 
Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating and the Jurisdiction Threat Rating from before (Table 11) 
(Incident Command 2008, TA41-TA42):   
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Table 11.  Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating Scoring (Incident Command 2008, TA42) 
Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating 
Rating 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Ju
ri
sd
ic
ti
o
n
 T
h
re
a
t 
R
a
ti
n
g
 10 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 
9 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 
8 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 
7 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 
6 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 
5 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 
4 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 
3 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 
2 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 
1 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
 
 This risk rating is then characterized by category.  The potential categories are:  very 
low, low, medium, high, and very high (Table 12).  These categories coincide with the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Advisory system (Figure 9).  The 
association of the Jurisdiction Risk Rating and DHS category are as follows (Incident 
Command 2008, TA43):   
Table 12. Jurisdiction Risk Rating Categories (Incident Command 2008, TA43). 
Jurisdiction Risk Rating Category 
1-5 Very Low 
6-10 Low 
11-15 Medium 
16-20 High 
21-22 Very High 
  
Assessment Example.   This assessment can be used for nearly any type of facility.  
For example, this vulnerability assessment may be used to test the vulnerability of a major 
city subway system.  It may have been previously determined that terrorist use of explosives 
is the top threat on this system today.  In this example we may have determined a score of 
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“8” for this PTE to develop our Jurisdiction Threat Rating.  After the vulnerability 
assessment we may have determined the Target Vulnerability Rating of this subway system 
to be a “20” after assessing each of the factors listed above.  To reduce subjectivity of the 
assessment, Target Vulnerability Rating is converted to a “7” (Table 10).  This value is used, 
along with the Jurisdiction Threat Rating to develop our Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating of 
“15” (Table 11).  Finally, this value coordinates with a “medium” Jurisdiction Risk Rating 
(Table 12).  This means that this subway system is of medium risk of an attack involving 
explosives.   
Phase 2:  Vulnerability Assessment- Farms 
 The National Defense University (NDU) identifies five areas which are vulnerable to 
agroterrorism.  These five areas include field crops, farm animals, food items in the 
processing and distribution chain, market-ready foods at the wholesale or retail level, and 
agricultural and food processing facilities (NCBRT 2007, 3-3).  This study does not focus on 
crops, and retail level production is not considered unique to Rockingham County or this 
research.  Phase 1 examined the processing facilities and one of the sectors of the 
distribution chain.  In Phase 2 the vulnerability assessment is expanded to the last area of 
vulnerability; the birds in the grow process. 
 To test the vulnerability of farms the CARVER + Shock program (FDA and 
APHIS) will be used.  CARVER is an assessment tool that measures Criticality, Accessibility, 
Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognizability of the agricultural system (NCBRT 
2007, 4-28).  The assessment scores will be provided as the following:  Criticality- estimate of 
economic damage an attack would cause to your operation; Accessibility- ease of which an 
attacker could reach a process and contaminate it; Recuperability- estimate of the amount of 
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time before sales from your operation can return to normal after attack; Vulnerability- 
likelihood that an attack would achieve the attacker’s immediate goals.  Shock is the factor of 
agricultural incidents which encompasses the health, economic, and psychological impacts of 
an attack.  In other words, Shock looks at the physical and direct impact of the public 
(NCBRT 2007, 5-11).  This program was designed to assess the potential for a successful 
terrorist attack on farms and where vulnerabilities exist to lead to terrorism (FDA 2009, 3). 
 Three farms were selected for this part of the assessment.  Each farm is operated by 
a different grower and follows oversight from one of two poultry companies associated with 
the facilities examined in Phase 1.  Farm visits were conducted at each of these farms.  Both 
a subjective and objective assessment was conducted on-site.  In the subjective assessment 
the evaluator examined personnel, operation, access, visibility, and control issues which may 
affect the vulnerability of the farm.  The farm is also evaluated for assessment factors which 
will be used by the CARVER program.  Operation maps of the farms were generated 
including: birds, buildings, equipment, feed, water supply, chemicals, storage, and farm 
access.  This information is then used to generate an operation map in the CARVER 
program (Figures 3-5). 
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Figure 3:  Farm A CARVER Operation Map. 
 
Figure 4:  Farm B CARVER Operation Map. 
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Figure 5:  Farm C CARVER Operation Map. 
 The program then produces a list of questions based on this operational map 
created by the user.  For Farm A these questions were answered primarily by the grower 
(Appendix B).  The questionnaires for Farms B and C were completed by the evaluator due 
to issues reaching agreement with the industry.  Only those results which relate to an attack 
involving a “highly contagious disease” which affects the entire flock are used.  The 
assessment generated by CARVER was used to make recommendations on how to decrease 
vulnerability at the farm level.       
Phase 3:  Fire Rescue Capabilities Assessment 
 The final phase of this study involves a capability and needs assessment of the fire 
rescue system in Rockingham County.  The capability assessment evaluates the ability of a 
jurisdiction to handle an agricultural incident.  The needs assessment uses data from this 
capability assessment to determine where the jurisdiction needs personnel, equipment, 
training, or other support to increase their capability to handle attack (NCBRT 2007, 5-12). 
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 Fire rescue was selected for this assessment because they can expect extensive 
involvement in the event of an agricultural incident.  Fire rescue responsibilities may include 
establishing and maintaining an Incident Command System (ICS), working in Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) around animals, agent identification, decontamination, animal 
euthanasia, and carcass disposal.    Fire rescue is often recognized as a “catch all” because 
they assume responsibility for most of the non-traditional emergency incidents.  For this 
reason it is imperative that the capabilities of fire rescue to respond to agricultural incidents 
be examined. 
 An assessment was generated in collaboration with Chief Robbie Symons for fire 
rescue and distributed to all of the Fire Captains in the county.  This assessment consists of 
two parts: a self preparedness declaration and a basic agricultural incident knowledge 
assessment (Appendix C).  The self assessment gives the Fire Captains the opportunity to 
evaluate their own personal level of preparedness in regards to incidents involving 
agriculture.  Additionally, the captains have the opportunity to request any additional training 
or equipment, or any other concerns they have which may affect or improve their 
preparedness level.    
 The second part of this survey is a basic agriculture knowledge assessment.  This 
short assessment asks questions relating specifically to fire rescue knowledge of agricultural 
emergencies and their responsibilities when responding.   This assessment was used to 
determine the knowledge level of responders and to evaluate training needs in the future. 
 
 
Results 
Phase 1:  Threat and Vulnerability Assessment- Industry 
 Five threat factors were analyzed for each Potential Threat Element (PTE).  Each 
PTE was scored individually with the highest possible score (10) as the highest threat level.  
ALF received the highest score of the four PTEs based on these threat factors (Table 13). 
Table 13.  PTE Threat Factor Results.   
 Existence  
 
(1) 
Violent 
History 
(1) 
Intentions  
 
(2) 
CBRNE 
Capability 
(2) 
Targeting  
 
(4) 
Threat 
Level  
(1-10) 
PETA 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ALF 1 1 2 2 4 10 
Islamic 
Extremist 
1 1 2 2 0 6 
Disgruntled 
Employee 
1 1 0 0 0 2 
 
Each facility was assessed for seven areas of vulnerability.  The facilities with the 
highest total score are deemed most vulnerable.  According to these vulnerability factors P2 
is the most vulnerable facility (Table 14). 
Table 14.  Individual Target Vulnerability Scores. 
Target Visibility Criticality Value Access Target 
Hazard 
Site 
Population 
Mass 
Casualty 
Total 
P1 4 3 3 4 3 2 5 24 
P2 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 25 
F1 4 2 1 4 0 0 5 16 
F2 4 1 1 4 0 0 5 15 
F3 3 2 1 3 0 0 5 14 
 
 The Target Vulnerability Ratings were determined using Table 10.  In this table the 
Total Vulnerability Score for each facility corresponds to a Target Vulnerability Rating.  A 
Target Vulnerability Rating was provided for each facility (Table 15). 
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Table 15.  Individual Target Vulnerability Ratings.   
Target Total Vulnerability  
Score 
Target Vulnerability 
 Rating 
P1 24 9 
P2 25 9 
F1 16 6 
F2 15 6 
F3 14 5 
 
 The highest Target Vulnerability Rating will be added to the Jurisdiction Threat 
Rating to develop The Jurisdiction Risk Rating.  This will be developed further in the 
discussion section. 
Phase 2:  Vulnerability Assessment- Farms 
 Farm A.  The first poultry farm was a smaller, two house operation in Broadway, 
VA.  The poultry operation is completely surrounded by a wire fence.  The entryway to the 
operation is shared by a neighbor farm, but there are also two gates which must be opened 
for one to access this operation by vehicle.  All company and contracted vehicles that enter 
the farm either self-disinfect or are disinfected before entering the operation.  The drivers of 
these trucks are not allowed in the chicken house at any time.  The grower limits access into 
the chicken house to himself, or those who are approved to enter after washing and donning 
a disposable suit.  All operations are dictated and overseen by representatives from the 
parent company (Farm A Grower 2011). 
This grower processes 108,000 chickens a year.  These chickens are delivered when 
they are one day old and typically are shipped out of the growers operation after five weeks.  
Individual culls, or sick birds, are sacrificed unless the entire population gets sick.  The birds 
that die before week five are composted in the litter building.  This grower only processes 
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broilers- no breeding or laying hens.  These birds are fed solid agar (corn and soybean mill) 
which are provided by the company.  Several feed storage containers are onsite.  Feed is 
delivered to these containers by the parent company and controlled on a computer based 
system which monitors feed consumption in the operation.  A water source is adjacent to 
the chicken house.  The water source is connected to a well which is several hundred yards 
from the poultry operation (Farm A Grower 2011). 
 Farm chemicals, equipment, and fuel are stored onsite.  A litter storage shed is 
adjacent to the first chicken house.  This shed stores all of the litter that will be used in the 
chicken houses.  The opposite end of this building is also used for composting.  When the 
grower finds a dead bird he will turn these birds into mounds of old litter to compost.  Next 
to the litter storage building is a covered area where the grower stores his tractors and other 
farm equipment.  Adjacent to the equipment area is a shed which contains small quantities of 
pesticide and herbicide.  Several propane tanks are located throughout the operation.  The 
grower declares up to 4,000 gallons of propane may be on site at any time (Farm A Grower 
2011).     
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Farm A Carver.  The following graphs were automatically generated by the 
CARVER program based off a 218 questionnaire completed by the Farm A Grower (Figure 
6). 
 
Figure 6.  Graphical representation of the attractiveness of each item in the operation 
for an attack involving a highly contagious disease which infects the entire 
population.  The blue bars represent importance (criticality + recuperability) and the 
red bars represent ease of attack (accessibility + vulnerability). 
 
Farm B.  This farm is in Hinton, VA and is well protected from the public eye; the 
property is not visible from the public road.  A sign is located along the road designating the 
grower’s company affiliation.  This two-house poultry operation is located at the end of a 
driveway atop a small hill; the driveway is shared with an adjacent farm which is visible from 
the roadway.  To enter the poultry farm one must pass through fencing which has a sign 
denoting the “disease free area.”  As with most poultry operations, the grower is only 
responsible for providing housing, food, and water for the chickens.  All other operations 
are dictated by the parent company (Farm B Grower 2011). 
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This grower runs a 54 day cycle with one new flock of broilers per cycle.  This 
grower receives chicks hours after their birth and keeps them on site for 34-36 days.  On 
average, 10-120 culls are removed from the operation each day.  Culls are composted in an 
outdoor, open shelter exclusive for carcass composting.  The grower has never had a need 
for veterinary services and could not comment on how this issue would be handled by the 
company.  Feed is delivered and controlled by the parent company.  There is one well on-site 
which provides water via an automated system for the birds (Farm B Grower 2011). 
The only chemical that is stored in bulk on-site is a poultry litter treatment.  This is a 
dry chemical stored in 50 pound bags which helps reduce ammonia levels in the litter.  On 
site visit the grower had 450 pounds stored in the chicken house, and claims to have up to 
1,500 lbs stored at any given time.  Two tanks of liquid propane are located between the two, 
2000 sq ft chicken houses.  These 500 gallon tanks are filled to 80% capacity to leave room 
for expansion. 
Farm B Carver.  The following charts were generated based off a 188 questionnaire 
developed through the CARVER program after visiting and speaking with the Farm B 
Grower.  This grower choose not to answer the questionnaire; questions were filled out by 
the surveyor (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7.  Graphical representation of the attractiveness of each item in the operation 
for an attack involving a highly contagious disease which infects the entire 
population.  The blue bars represent importance (criticality + recuperability) and the 
red bars represent ease of attack (accessibility + vulnerability). 
Farm C.  The final poultry farm visited was in Singers Glen, VA and is the largest of 
the three operations.  While larger, this operation proved to be very similar to the others.  
This grower has two single story chicken houses and a one two story chicken house in 
operation.  This grower also has another single story chicken house under construction.  
This operation is in a more rural area of the county and is completely surrounded by a wire 
fence.  The farm is located along a county road with strong visibility from the roadway.  The 
grower also owns a house on the property which he rents out.  The grower does not let 
anyone in his operation other than his family, the parent company, and approved 
contractors.  Only the grower and his family are allowed interaction with the birds during 
grow operations (Farm C Grower 2011).        
Currently this grower produces about 385,000 adult birds a year with that number 
expected to grow when the new chicken houses is operational.  This grower also receives 
birds at one day old and keeps them approximately 4-6 weeks.  Culls are removed daily from 
the chicken houses and veterinary services will only be required in the event of an entire 
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population illness.  This grower practices onsite composting for culls.  Composting is 
conducted in the litter barn with waste liter is used for these composting operations.  This 
grower only raises broilers which are fed solid agar and watered by an on-site well which is 
shared by the rental house on property.  Feed, water, and ventilation are controlled by a 
computer system installed by the parent company.  A litter broker will clean waste litter 
directly from the chicken houses to be taken to an offsite location.  No waste, other than 
that used to compost, is stored on site (Farm C Grower 2011).     
This grower does not store chemicals or litter on location.  For financial reasons, the 
grower only purchases these items as needed in a quantity required for current operations.  
The litter barn stores fresh litter, waste litter (compost pile), and a farm tractor.  A separate 
building contains a 100 KW generator with 27 gallons of fuel for approximately 1,650 hours 
of power to all chicken houses.  Several propane tanks are located adjacent to the chicken 
houses.  There may be up to 3,000 gallons of propane on site at any given time (Farm C 
Grower 2011).        
Farm C Carver.  The following charts were generated based off a 163 questionnaire 
developed through the CARVER program after visiting and speaking with the Farm C 
Grower.  This grower choose not to answer the questionnaire; questions were filled out by 
the surveyor (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.  Graphical representation of the attractiveness of each item in the operation 
for an attack involving a highly contagious disease which infects the entire 
population.  The blue bars represent importance (criticality + recuperability) and the 
red bars represent ease of attack (accessibility + vulnerability). 
 
Phase 3:  Fire Rescue Capabilities Assessment 
 The survey distributed to fire rescue Captains was split into two categories:  
agricultural incident preparedness and agricultural incident knowledge.  The first question in 
the agricultural incident preparedness survey asked what the crew felt their average level of 
agricultural incident training was.  Of the five crews surveyed, two declared no agriculture 
training, one with awareness training, and two with technician level training.  When asked 
how often crews trained for agriculture incidents one crew states they train annually, and the 
rest of the crews state they never participate in agriculture training.  The crew that claims to 
train annually states that this training is merely an informal discussion.  The next question 
asked if crews had the equipment and/or training to handle agriculture incidents.  Most 
crews didn’t feel they were equipped or trained to handle these incidents.  One crew felt they 
have the training but no equipment, and one crew felt they had the equipment but no 
training.  One crew believes they have a moderate understanding of their responsibilities at 
an agriculture incident but the rest of the crews declare they have little or no understanding 
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of their responsibilities.  All crews stated they were not prepared to handle an agriculture 
incident themselves and would benefit from a unified command structure.  They feel a 
unified command structure could better help them understand their expectations and 
responsibilities at an agricultural incident.  Crews feel they would be better prepared to 
handle these incidents if they had at least awareness level training.  They state their greatest 
inadequacy is lack of training to understand what qualifies an agricultural incident as 
terrorism, and how they are supposed to respond.  The final question asked Captains to put 
their crew in a preparedness level category.  One Captain placed his crew in the awareness 
category and the rest placed themselves in the limited capability category. 
 The second part of this capability assessment involved a basic knowledge evaluation 
of the crews.  In this assessment 29 points were available.  All crews completed this 
assessment and the average score was a 21 out of 29 points which results in a 73% accuracy.  
For fairness and confidentially of crews, individual scores are not reported.  The questions 
that were most missed are as follows: 
 Question 1:  All crews understood it would be their responsibility to establish and 
maintain ICS.  Most crews also understood they would be required to decontaminate 
people, animals, and equipment.  Some crews understood that they would be 
required to work in personal protective equipment (PPE) and identify unknown 
agents.  However, no crews understood that they may be used for animal euthanasia 
and carcass disposal. 
 Question 2:  Most crews did not know that explosives are considered a weapon of 
mass destruction. 
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 Question 3:  Only two crews understood that FBI always has primary investigative 
authority over incidents of suspected terrorism. 
 Question 4:  Two crews understood that one entrance/exit is desirable to monitor 
what moves on and off the farm.  The rest of the crews believed separate entrances 
and exits are more important to prevent cross contamination. 
 Question 19:  Only two crews recognized the farm-to-fork theory which means that 
any of the selections provided could be considered and agricultural incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
Phase 1:  Threat and Vulnerability Assessment- Industry 
Threats 
 The first step of the threat and vulnerability assessment was to develop a list of 
potential threat elements.  The PTEs selected are those organizations which were deemed a 
potential threat to the poultry industry.   The potential threat elements selected were:  People 
of the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Islamic 
Extremists (e.g. Al Qaeda), and Disgruntled Employees.   
PETA.  PETA is the largest animal rights organization in the world.  PETA 
identifies four areas of focus on which they observe unethical treatment of animals on 
factory farms, clothing trade, laboratories, and the entertainment industry (About PETA 
2010).  According to the PETA website they “maintain a creed of nonviolence and does not 
advocate actions in which anyone, human or nonhuman, is injured” (Does PETA Advocate 
Violence? 2010).  In the existence category it was determined that PETA does have access to 
this jurisdiction; however, they have no intentions of unlawful use of force or violence.  
Other than violent individuals whom associated with PETA, the organization has no violent 
history.  PETA also shows no intentions or targeting as they have no documented terrorist 
intentions or activity against the poultry industry.  Finally, PETA has no capability or 
intentions to acquire and use CBRNE.  PETA is observed as an activist in the poultry 
industry but is not observed as a significant PTE in this assessment thus a score of 0. 
ALF.  The Animal Liberation Front is an organization similar to PETA whose 
primary goal is to reduce animal suffering.  Unlike PETA, ALF is known to use violence 
against civilian targets to further their objective which classifies them as a domestic terrorist 
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organization (Reichard 2007, 22).  This justifies their existence and violent history.  ALF 
alludes to their intentions through statements released by their Press Officer Lindy Greene.  
In a press release on their website Greene States “Even the ALF… have recently employed 
arson or explosives in the commission of underground direct actions.”  Greene states that 
ALF has a moral obligation to use violence, as a last resort, in the protection of animal 
interests.  She notes that as a society we are not hesitant to use violence to protect humans, 
and it is the duty of ALF to do the same for animals.  ALF has also been reported to send 
members to infiltrate laboratories and animal processing facilities.  By employing themselves 
in these facilities they are able to get insider information and develop plans for future actions 
(Leader 2003).  ALF does not consider themselves terrorists; rather they define themselves 
as “visionaries and freedom fighters” (Greene 2010).  Greene’s press statements are a self-
admittance to their intentional threat and use of violence.  Her statements also support 
multiple reports of ALF using, or intending to use, explosive and incendiary weapons.   Also, 
similar to PETA, ALF targets those who, in their opinion, abuse animals for food, clothing, 
research etc.  However, where PETA received a 0 in this category for lack of violent or 
terrorist activities, ALF is an identified domestic terrorist and has declared they will use 
violence in furtherance of their objective.  ALF has gone public with their anger towards the 
poultry industry.  In January 2007 a large fire spread through the Tegel poultry processing 
plant in Hornby, New Zealand.  While ALF did not take responsibility for this fire, they 
confessed that they were “overjoyed” with the incident.  They quickly posted a release on 
their website which states that ALF is delighted these facilities were destroyed and that no 
more chickens will see their death in the near future.  ALF describes a process that exposes 
birds to toxic fumes, waste, and abuse from workers.  The final destination of these birds 
involves their throats being slit and their bodies dropped in scalding hot water to remove 
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their feathers.  ALF describes these conditions to declare war on the poultry industry to end 
bird suffering (Chicken Factory Burned 2010).  This is one example of ALF’s obvious 
targeting of the poultry industry giving ALF a total score of 10. 
In a discussion with Lt. Jeff Rhodes (local poultry farmer and Asst. Fire Marshal with 
the City of Harrisonburg) he notes that domestic terrorism is of increasing importance in the 
security of our community at the local level.  He discussed ELF (Earth Liberation Front- a 
close relative of ALF) and ALF as being genuine, documented threats to the Rockingham 
County community.  He affirmed that reliable sources have reported members of both 
organizations present in Rockingham County.  In his opinion, these organizations are the 
largest threat to the poultry industry- much more so than international terrorist organizations 
(Rhodes 2011).   
ALF is related to a sister organization known as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF).  
The two organizations are known as highly active domestic terrorists.  According to the FBI, 
these two organizations have been responsible for 600 attacks which cause $43 million in 
damages (Leader 2003).  ALF and ELF follow a principle called “leaderless resistance.”  This 
principal was developed by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and Aryan Nations as a technique 
where terrorist groups can carry out violent acts while reducing the involvement of law 
enforcement.  These groups are able to effectively resist law enforcement involvement by 
organizing with no central authority.  With no central authority it is much harder to track 
those responsible for their violent actions.  On ELF’s website they explain the importance of 
this theory to their operation:  “By operating in cells (small groups that consist of one to 
several people), the security of group members is maintained.  Each cell is anonymous not 
only to the public but also to one another.  This decentralized structure helps keep activists 
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out of jail and free to continue conducing actions.”  With many domestic terrorists 
employing this practice, and many targeting those who work in the ecosystem and 
agriculture, domestic terrorists are highly dangerous and very difficult to catch (Leader 2003). 
Islamic Extremists.  Islamic extremism is one of our most dangerous international 
terrorist threats to the United States.  Islamic extremist groups dedicate their cause to Jihad, 
or the holy war which they believe to be the cause of Islam.  Al Qaeda is on the forefront of 
Islamic extremist terrorism with estimates of 15,000 known members worldwide.  Al Qaeda, 
under direction of Osama Bin Laden, has taken responsibility for a number of terrorist 
attacks on the United States, most notably the attack on September 11th, 2001.  Islamic 
extremism (e.g. Al Qaeda) has an overwhelming existence and violent history (Encyclopedia 
of Bioterrorism Defense 2005, 17). 
Al Qaeda’s past operations show their modus operandi to be the use of conventional 
weapons on high profile targets.  However, vulnerabilities exist in targets with a lower profile 
whose attractiveness to terrorist organizations is increasing.  These targets (critical 
infrastructure sectors including agriculture and food) may be part of a shift in operations (Al 
Qaeda:  An Organization to be Reckoned With 2006, 37). 
There are several arguments for why Al Qaeda may use agriculture for bioterrorism.  
First, agriculture is an easier target for bioterrorism, and if successful, Al Qaeda would get 
much attention for the first successful bioterrorism attack on U.S. soil.  Al Qaeda is also 
known as an apolitical terrorist organization.  This means their primary motive is to destroy 
their adversaries through a host of methods including killing its citizens and destroying its 
infrastructure.  As an apolitical terrorist organization, Al Qaeda has shown definite interest 
in methods of attack which destroy a nation’s infrastructure.  As discussed a vast economic 
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impact is likely with an agriculture attack.  Al Qaeda would seek this economic impact as part 
of their larger scheme to destroy the infrastructure of the United States.  “It is very 
important to concentrate on hitting the American economy with every available tool… the 
economy is the base of its military power… The United States has a great economy, but it is 
fragile” –Osama Bin Laden (Ungerer 2006, 147).  Troops in Afghanistan have also located 
documents from which Al Qaeda discuss agriculture as a potential target (NCBRT 2007, 4-
4).  Sources are confident that agriculture is one of the potential future targets of Al Qaeda 
(Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense 2005, 14).     
As stated above, Al Qaeda has an extensive history of use of conventional weapons 
(explosives and incendiaries).  Rumors are emerging that Al Qaeda is now expanding its 
weapon research to chemical, biological, and radiological type weapons.  The Al Qaeda 
training manual has no specific instructions for the production and use of such weapons.  
The only reference in the manual is on the extrication process of the toxins such as Ricin 
and Abrin.  Additionally, there have been several reports (journalists and other less-credible 
sources) of Al Qaeda interest in CBRNE type weapons; none of which have been confirmed 
by credible government or military sources.  One incident was noted by General Richard 
Meyers, militarily spokesperson in Afghanistan.  He reported in March 2002 that U.S. forces 
had discovered what they believed to be an amateur bioweapons laboratory.  There were 
traces of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax bacterium) and ricin toxin in several hideouts known to be 
inhabited by Al Qaeda.  They reported the amounts which were detected were so minimal 
that there was no threat of a major bioweapon production.  While credible sources report 
that Al Qaeda has interest in acquiring WMD capability, they have not reported any activity 
of major concern to date (Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense 2005, 19-20). 
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That being said, Al Qaeda does have an extensive history of a CBRNE weapon: 
conventional explosives.  Al Qaeda has taken responsibility for at least 15 attacks involving 
explosives since 1993.  Some of their more well known attacks on include:  1993- bombing 
of the World Trade Center (New York, NY, USA) killing six; 2000- bombing of the USS 
Cole (Port of Aden, Yemen) killing seventeen;  2002- vehicle bomb near U.S. Consulate 
(Karachi, Pakistan) killing eleven; and the 2003-truck bombing of UN Headquarters 
(Baghdad, Iraq) killing 23.  
Al Qaeda likely views agriculture to be a good target, and may be in the process of 
developing weapons and plans to conduct an attack.  However, no overwhelming evidence 
(written plans, surveillance, drawings etc.) can be found from credible sources to prove that 
Al Qaeda is actively targeting agriculture.  Military intelligence has not discovered any 
detailed plans or information sensitive to agriculture within Al Qaeda.  This lack of credible 
evidence of these activities shows no agricultural targeting.  Islamic Extremism receives a 
total score of 6. 
  Disgruntled Employee.  Disgruntled Employees are those who may still be 
employed, or have been recently released, and hold some vendetta against the agricultural 
facility that employed them.  While the occurrences are low, Disgruntled Employees have 
attacked the agricultural sector in the past which gives them a low score for existence and 
history.  In 1996 a disgruntled laboratory employee intentionally introduced Shigella dysenteria 
infecting twelve people (Terrorist Threat to Food 2002, 5).  In 2004 nearly 100 people in 
Michigan were affected by nicotine poisoning from eating ground beef from which a 
Disgruntled Employee had poisoned (Nicotine Poisoning After Ingestion of Contaminated 
Ground Beef 2003).  Finally, in the early 2000’s on a poultry farm in McGaheysville, VA, a 
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recently fired employee dumped 5 gallons diesel fuel into the water source for chickens.  
That water source is still not acceptable for use today in poultry operations (Farm A Grower 
2011).  
 With low occurrence of Disgruntled Employee actions (when compared to our 
terrorist organizations) there is not much credible evidence of overwhelming intentions or 
targeting from Disgruntled Employees.  These lone offenders may have the intentions of 
conducting such attacks, and may have diagrams and plans drafted, however these pieces of 
evidence must have not been retrieved with enough threat to warrant publication suggesting 
little or no significant attack planning.  
 Finally, these employees may have access to CBRNE materials in the workplace; 
however they likely lack the ability to use these materials as a weapon.  A Disgruntled 
Employee will not have the money, resources, skills, and training to produce these weapons 
in quantities which may be used against the agricultural industry or otherwise as a weapon.  
However they are still considered a threat to individual farms and producers.  
Vulnerability 
 Processing Plant 1.  The first poultry facility is located along a main street in a small 
town.  Its facility and grounds take up an entire block.  The facility has large, distinct signage 
on all sides of the building.  Additionally, the odor of cooked chicken can be identified 
several blocks away.  This facility is highly visible and its existence is well known.   
 This facility was determined to be significantly useful to the community.  The 
company is one of the largest employers for this town and generates much revenue.  There 
would be over 500 jobs lost if this facility was destroyed.  There are many businesses within 
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several hundred feet of this facility, with one business physically attached to the building.  A 
long recovery period would be expected for this facility and those adjacent. 
 This facility would be one of the better targets for a PTE.  They could expect to 
induce hundreds of casualties with a significant economic impact on the community.  The 
impact would remain local with some effects felt at the state level.  While an attack on this 
facility would likely reach national news (especially if suspected to be terrorism), a single 
facility attack would not be expected to cause widespread panic in the nation.  This facility 
was assessed to have a medium importance. 
 Accessibility proved to be the most difficult area to assess for all of the facilities.  
There is some ambiguity with this rating because some of the security information (standard 
operating procedures, security procedures etc.) is not readily accessible to the public.  This 
ambiguity is expected to be resolved by the design of the scoring system at the end of this 
assessment.  Three areas were observed for Accessibility:  parking, access, and ventilation.  
At this facility there is parking within 125 feet of the building.  The location of this building 
makes it difficult to limit unauthorized traffic around the building.  There is a parking lot 
across the street from the facility which has vehicles parked within 55 feet of the roast and 
breading pack-out area.  Additionally, the attached business has customer parking within 45 
feet of the breading pack-out area.  There is one parking lot adjacent to the facility but this 
parking lot is designated for employees only.  During the site visit, the only vehicles at this 
location were operated by the business.  Additionally, there are “no parking next to building” 
signs on the sides of the building where a vehicle may pull off the public road.  It was noted 
that public roadways allow vehicles to drive within 25 feet of the building.  Visitor parking 
was 150 feet away located at an evacuation area.  Access to the building interior is well 
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protected.  There is one main entrance to the building which is protected by a gate and guard 
shack.  Finally, this facility, along with all facilities assessed in this study, has no protection of 
its air source and no filtration internal to the system. 
 Major concentrations of CBRNE materials are present.  This facility reports 
approximately 80,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia on location which has been deemed 
the greatest CBRNE threat (P1 Rockingham County Fire Rescue Pre-Plan 2009).  This 
chemical agent can be weaponized as an inhalational hazard with 330 parts per million (ppm) 
exposure considered immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) (Wiser Hazmat 2010).  
The facility also has small quantities of corrosives including:  sulfuric acid, sodium 
hydroxide, and alkaline cleaners (Saxton 2009, 1-8).  There is also small a quantity of No. 2 
fuel oil which may be used in explosives (Saxton 2009, 4).  Both documents suggest that 
these chemicals are locked away or under the control of authorized employees.  Specific 
locking and personnel authorization information was not available. 
 The Target Site Population Capacity shows there may be up to 500 people on site at 
one time.  They estimate to have 350 employees working during the day and 275 working at 
night (P1 Rockingham County Fire Rescue Pre-Plan 2009). 
 The last factor assessed for P1 was the Potential for Mass Casualty.  As stated above 
this facility is located in the center of a town with a population greater than 5,000 people 
within a one-mile radius.  The total Vulnerability Rating for this facility is 24 which 
corresponds to a Target Vulnerability Score of 9 (Table 10).  This Target Vulnerability Score 
will be used in the next step after all the facilities have been reviewed. 
 Processing Plant 2.  This facility is also located in a small town situated along a 
primary highway.  It has several hundred employees and is one of the largest employers in 
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the town.  There are several signs on the side of the building identifying the facility and a 
chain-link fence line which surrounds the building.  Its visibility is high and existence is well 
known. 
  Similar to P1, this facility is significantly useful to the community.  With over 1100 
employees this facility has the potential for a significant loss of life if attacked.  It is highly 
productive and offers many jobs to the town and surrounding community.  If attacked, it 
would be considered a significant economic loss to the entire county.  A long recovery 
period would be required to revive this facility and the surrounding town.  Facility 
reconstruction and employee hire and training would require extensive effort.  Nonetheless, 
this town would forever be considered a terrorist target making the recovery process longer 
and more arduous. 
 This plant has a high employment capacity and strong importance to this town’s 
economy.  This facility also caters to non-native speakers.  They post “se habla español” 
outside of the building to try and attract people who may be reluctant to apply because of 
their poor English.  This facility is considered highly valuable to the increasing Hispanic 
population in the county. 
 Parking is the first area of concern when looking at access.  As stated above, this 
facility is located adjacent to a primary county highway.  Vehicles may be parked along the 
shoulder of this highway and be within 60 feet of the evisceration area of the plant.  
Additionally, there is visitor parking prior to the facility guard shack within 100 feet of the 
main entrance.  While one can walk right up to many parts of the building, all doors are 
closed.  Access to the office building is protected by a guard shack and gate.  Additionally, 
the main processing area is located across the road and protected by a guard shack.  Access 
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to these parking areas, as well as the building, is limited by chain-link fence.  An enclosed, 
protected walkway connects the two buildings.  During a site visit it was noted that outside 
storage of bird trailers was not fenced or protected.  With unprotected and unfiltered air 
sources, these collaborative factors give this facility a high Access to Target rating. 
 These first four assessment areas (Tables 3-6) scored the same for P1 and P2.  The 
last three areas had significant differences in their vulnerability scores.  For CBRNE Target 
Hazard P2 has a higher rating.  The P2 facility has 30,000 lbs of anhydrous ammonia on 
location (P2 Rockingham County Fire Rescue Pre-Plan 2009).  This corrosive chemical can 
be fatal if used as an inhalation agent (Wiser Hazmat 2010).  The chemical is stored outside 
of the engine room and the physical containers may be accessible to the public (McPike 
2009).  This facility also has No. 2 Oil which is located outside south of the garage (McPike 
2009).  In addition, there are small quantities of other corrosives including ferric chloride, 
nitric acid, peroxyacetic acid, sodium hydroxide, and sulfuric acid.  All of these are located 
inside of the facility behind closed doors (McPike 2009).  Because this facility has larger 
amounts of CBRNE type materials which are located outdoors, this facility receives a high 
Target Threat of Hazard rating. 
 The P2 facility has approximately 675 employees during the day and 550 at night (P2 
Rockingham County Fire Rescue Pre-Plan 2009).  This makes P2 moderately vulnerable with 
respect to its Target Site Population Capacity. 
 Finally, the Potential for Mass Casualty is less in this facility than P1 because it is 
located adjacent to the town, not directly within it.  Additionally, the town which it is 
adjacent to is smaller than that of P1.  The P2 facility has a mass casualty with the potential 
of 1,001-5,000 community victims within a one-mile radius. 
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With a Total Vulnerability Score of 25, this facility is the most vulnerable of those 
examined.  This vulnerability score translates to a Target Vulnerability Rating of 9 (Table 10). 
 Feed Mill 1.  The first feed mill proved a lower vulnerability than both of the 
processing plants.  The feed mill did have a Visibility rating as high as the processing plants 
however.  This is because this facility is located in the downtown area of a small city.  The 
facility is not well marked in terms of company identity and function, but its existence is 
well-known.  The criticality of this facility is somewhat less than the processing facilities 
because the feed mills do not produce the actual product that the general public consumes.  
The biggest hit would be felt on the growers within the industry.  Additionally, this feed mill 
only offers a small number of jobs and does not generate as much revenue.  An incident at a 
feed mill could cause a cascading affect throughout the system, but if this one facility was 
attacked the impact would not be overwhelming on the community.  Because the criticality is 
low, the number of employees is low, and there is not much economic profit from this 
facility, the value of this target to serve the motives of a PTE is also very low, rated at a 2.  
As far as a direct impact on agriculture, this facility is not much a value to the PTE.  A PTE 
would also be more attracted to the government facilities in the same area if they were trying 
to generate a geographical impact in the city.  Similar to the processing facilities, this feed 
mill has a high Access rating.  There is parking at an adjacent business which is 40 feet from 
the broiler room at this facility.  There are several parking areas close to the building which 
are marked for employees and have towing enforcement signs.  With the small number of 
employees at this location, it is likely they will recognize a car that doesn’t belong in their 
parking area.  This facility is located on a corner of two roads and a railroad.  The heavy 
traffic in the area, with many non-descript parking spots close to the building raises the 
Access value for this facility.  Accessing the facility appears to be controlled.  All doors are 
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closed and marked for employees only, with one visitor entrance clearly marked.  One 
potential point of entry is through the open bay which trucks use to fill their feed.  However, 
with the small number of employees the tight visitor access will likely be controlled by the 
personnel working this area.  The air at this facility is also not protected or filtered.     
 There are various 55 gallon drums of corrosives located in the broiler room (F1 
Rockingham County Fire Rescue Pre-Plan 2001).  However there are no CBRNE materials 
present in large quantities.   
 The facility has a total of 18 occupants during the day and 10 at night (F1 
Rockingham County Fire Rescue Pre-Plan 2001).  This small number of occupants gives it a 
0 for Target Site Population Capacity.  Lastly, as we stated this facility is located in the 
downtown area of a small city.  There are more than 5,000 people within a one-mile radius. 
 This feed mill only received a Total Vulnerability Score of 16.  This value 
corresponds with a Vulnerability Rating of 6 (Table 10).    
 Feed Mill 2.  This feed mill is located directly across from F1 and shares the same 
Visibility factors.  It is located downtown in a small city, its existence is obvious, but there 
are few markings on the building to define what it is.   
 This facility has the lowest Criticality of all of the facilities assessed.  An attack would 
only have a direct impact on the poultry industry.  It is noted that this feed mill is only one 
amongst a network of many mills in the county.  If this one is lost there would not be too 
much damage to the industry.  Additionally, this facility has the lowest number of employees 
among all the facilities which also drives down its Criticality.  With a lower number of 
employees and less economic profit this facility was determined to be somewhat useful.  The 
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loss of this facility would be noticeable but would have little impact on the community; 
especially the general public. 
 As with Criticality, the value of this facility is low in the community.  It does not 
generate much revenue and provides less than a dozen jobs.  A PTE would be unlikely to 
use this target as it would find the other facilities in the poultry industry more attractive as 
they carry much greater vulnerability and risk.  This facility receives a very low Value of 
Target rating. 
 This target has access issues similar to F1.  There are several areas within 125 feet 
where unauthorized vehicles can park.  There is a business across the street where vehicles 
can be parked within 115 feet of the mill’s storage towers.  There is a second parking lot 
where vehicles can park at this same distance, or even a few feet closer.  There is parking on 
premises, within 60 feet of the building; however this parking lot is marked employee-only 
with towing enforcement.  With the small number of employees a car that’s out of place 
would likely be recognized quickly.  Access to the building is restricted and all doors are 
closed and marked for employees only.  There is no guard shack or fencing around the 
facility.  There is, however, a separate building for visitors which has an enclosed bridge into 
the facility.  Finally, the air is also unprotected and unfiltered at this facility. 
 There are small amounts of pesticide and insecticide present but they are very 
minimal and reported as not on premises on a daily basis (F2 Rockingham County Fire 
Rescue Pre-Plan 2001). 
   The Site Population Capacity is rated a 0 because there are only 11 employees total:  
10 during the day and 1 at night. 
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 This facility also receives a high Potential for Mass Casualty rating because it is 
located downtown in a city with more than 5,000 people per one-mile radius. 
 This feed mill received a Total Vulnerability Score of 15 which is comparable to the 
feed mill located on the adjacent property.  A score of 15 provides a Vulnerability Rating of 
6 (Table 10). 
 Feed Mill 3.  This facility is less visible than the other facilities because it is located 
outside of a downtown area and is located several hundred feet off the road.  There is a 
small sign along the road identifying its existence but the facility is not as overtly obvious as 
the others.  Still, there are company logos on several tall towers so this facility receives a 
medium Visibility rating.  Its existence is probably well known. 
 This facility rates a low Criticality like the other feed mills.  The operation at this 
facility is larger than the other two, and there are more jobs available to the public.  
However, its Criticality is still considered to be low because the impact of facility loss would 
only be felt in the industry and no direct impact would be passed on to the public.  Its loss 
would be an inconvenience to the industry but the resiliency of the industry would allow for 
a short recovery.   
 This target is not useful to a PTE.  It is further away from population and business 
than the other feed mills and does not have a high inherent population or value.  This facility 
rates very low relative to Target Value. 
 Access to this target is more restricted than the other feed mills.  The primary 
advantage this facility has is limited vehicle access.  There is a single lane access road to the 
facility which is guarded by a gate and guard shack.  All parking on premises is authorized by 
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entry through this guard shack.  There is no unauthorized parking in the area for at least 150 
feet.  Two guard shacks on premise have a moderately broad view of the grounds.  With 
controlled access and security personnel on site this facility seems to be difficult to access.  It 
appears the infrastructure is in place to protect this facility; however site visits revealed that 
the guard shack is not always manned.  Finally, unprotected air and no filtration give this 
facility an average Access rating. 
     No. 2 fuel is stored on location, but no significant CBRNE material is present (F3 
Rockingham County Fire Rescue Pre-Plan 2004).  All three feed facilities received a 0 in the 
Target Threat of Hazard category. 
 All three feed facilities also received a 0 for Site Population Capacity.  F3 has 
approximately 37 occupants during the day and eight at night (F3 Rockingham County Fire 
Rescue Pre-Plan 2004).  F3 is also located in a small city with more than 5,000 people in a 
one-mile radius. 
 F3 received the lowest Total Vulnerability Score of the three with a total of 14.  This 
facility receives a lower Vulnerability Rating of 5 (Table 10). 
 The Jurisdiction Vulnerability Rating is generated using the Jurisdiction Threat 
Rating and the highest Target Vulnerability Rating.  ALF gave us the highest Jurisdiction 
Threat Rating of 10.  P2 gave us the Highest Vulnerability Rating of 9.  These two values 
combine to an overall Jurisdiction Risk Rating of 19 (Table 11).  This rating falls in the 
category of High Risk (Table 12).  According to the DHS National Advisory system the 
poultry industry in Rockingham County is at high risk of attack and should be on orange 
alert for risk of terrorist attacks (Figure 9).   
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Figure 9.  United States Department of Homeland Security National Advisory 
System (Homeland Security Advisory System 2010). 
This National Advisory System provides a good illustration of the threat today, but it 
is noted that this system is currently seeing changes.  The U.S. Department of Homeland 
security has started a 90 day implementation period beginning January 27th, 2011 to switch to 
a new National Terrorism Advisory System.  Currently this new system is still in 
implementation and the old DHS National Advisory System will remain in effect until the 
switch over projected for late April 2011 (National Terrorism Advisory System 2011). 
Phase 2:  Vulnerability Assessment- Farms 
 Farm A.  The farm is fenced off and well off the road.  There is a sign designating 
grower name and company affiliation along the road.  However, to one with limited 
knowledge of poultry operations it may not be clear which farm belongs to the owner as 
several farms share the same driveway.  Vehicular access to the farm is well guarded by two 
gates.  A sign at the gate denotes the operation as a “disease free area” to encourage 
restricted access from possible disease carrying organisms.  Additionally, the grower’s home 
is located on a hill a few hundred yards from the operation.  The grower is easily able to 
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watch for unauthorized vehicle traffic from his home.  The chicken houses are also equipped 
with locked, alarmed doors (Farm A Grower 2011). 
 Four liquid propane tanks are located within 20 feet of the primary chicken house 
along the driveway through operations.  This location may be advantageous to an attacker 
who would be interested in using these tanks as an incendiary weapon or to induce a 
BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion).  The grower was not concerned with 
this phenomenon as these tanks were designed to withstand considerable fire and heat 
exposure.  He recalled an incident where one of his buildings burnt down exposing the tanks 
to significant heat.  The only damage found on the tank was on the lid (Farm A Grower 
2011).         
 Contamination of the feed would not be difficult.  The grower admits it would be 
hard for him to see someone on the farm at nighttime.  An attacker would easily be able to 
walk up to the feed storage tanks and introduce a host of agents.  These units have a door on 
the top to access the feed.  This door has no locking mechanism. (Farm A Grower 2011). 
This grower states his greatest fear is that an attacker would cut the power source in 
his operation.  He states in the hot summer months, if power was cut to his ventilation 
system, birds would die within minutes.  If an attacker were to get into the locked control 
room and successfully disable the alarm, it would be very easy to kill the ventilation system 
and subsequently the entire population (Farm A Grower 2011).     
On site visit the grower made comments about future expansion and biosecurity 
improvements.  First, the grower is planning to move all chicken houses to the backside of 
the property.  This improves biosecurity as visitors and delivery personnel do not have to 
drive past the chicken houses on their visit.  This allows the grower to limit the access to the 
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chicken house area.  The grower has also recommended improvements in his biosecurity 
measures within the chicken houses.  Currently all visitors to the chicken houses are required 
to wear disposable suits into the building.  The grower plans to install a small washing 
station (with shower) so that visitors with questionable contamination may shower before 
they don their disposable suit and interact with the birds (Farm A Grower 2011).    
Farm A CARVER.  The CARVER program returns results on farm Importance 
and Ease of Attack.  Within importance includes Criticality and Vulnerability.  Ease of 
Attack defines the areas of Accessibility and Recuperability.  For Farm A the three most 
attractive areas for attack are the broilers, water supply, and new poultry.  These three items 
in the operation are considered by this assessment to be the most paramount to the 
operation.  Their scores will be examined in detail. 
With a total score of 30 (40 being the highest, or most vulnerable, score) broilers 
proved to be the most attractive area of attack.  The broilers had the highest scores in 
Accessibility and Recuperability.  CARVER suggests many areas where the grower can 
reduce this Ease of Attack rating.  First and foremost, the grower needs to limit access to the 
farm.  This grower has done a good job isolating his farm off of the road and fairly well out 
of the public view.  However, he shares a driveway with an adjacent farm and access to the 
farm is isolated to a single open gate area.  Visitor access is well controlled beyond this point 
and visitors are accompanied by farm personnel the entire time they are on the farm.  The 
farmer also discussed many options to improve his visitor access in the future.  However, if 
money and resources permit this grower can improve his access by replacing his wire fence 
with a security fence and locked gate at the entrance.  Access to the building is controlled by 
locked and alarmed doors.  However, these simple hollow frame doors are only locked by 
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the doorknob.  This grower should consider stronger dead bolt locks on all buildings in the 
operation.  Once visitors are on premise they should be required to wear disposable clothing 
and footwear.  The grower is taking good steps in planning to build a “wash in” station near 
the entrance to the farm to ensure visitors are clean and in the proper attire. 
Watering and new poultry received the same scores in both areas.  They both 
received the higher scores in Accessibility and Recuperability, but lower scores in Criticality 
and Vulnerability.  For watering, Accessibility is high due to the Ease of Access to the 
watering system.  The farmer has a well on site which is used for the poultry operation.  This 
well is open and easily accessible to those who can make access.  Also, all control 
mechanisms are located near the entrance which is exposed to visitors in an area which was 
once covered by a building which had burned down.  To better protect this vital water 
source the grower needs to make it a priority that he secures these water controls within a 
structure.  The grower does have redundancy on site as a second well close by could be used 
for the operation.  However, this well is also shared by the farm residents.  A second water 
source dedicated solely to the operation could help reduce this vulnerability.  Finally, the 
CARVER program recommends reducing the vulnerability at watering.  This vulnerability 
can be reduced by making the watering system in the chicken house less accessible to 
visitors.  Also, the grower can reduce vulnerability by cleaning the water system on a daily or 
weekly basis.   
Finally, new poultry coming onto the farm exhibit an added area of vulnerability.  
CARVER’s greatest recommendation is to limit those numbers of people who have access 
to the new birds.  Also, for those new birds that die, rather than immediately composting, 
CARVER recommends testing birds, even in instances of seemingly usual disease. 
63 
 
 
 
CARVER also ranks the highest risk areas under each of the assessment areas.  For 
this farm the feed storage was rated highest for Criticality.  This means if an attacker were to 
target the feed storage on the farm they could cause more severe economic damage than if 
they had attacked any other item.  The food storage area also ranked highest for the 
Accessibility score.  This poses a particularly high vulnerability.  Food storage is highly 
critical and highly accessible; this makes it a top target.  The broilers ranked highest in 
Vulnerability and Recuperability.  This means the birds are most vulnerable to attack, or 
would meet the needs of the attacker the best, and would take the most time to replace to 
normal operation. 
Overall CARVER identifies vulnerabilities in accessibility to the farm with the top 
targets being the water supply, broilers, and feed storage.  These areas are the most 
fundamental to the operation. 
Farm B.  This operation is well hidden off the roadway on a small hill.  A long, tight 
driveway among several residential and farming buildings would make it difficult for a quick 
in-and-out type attack.  The sign along the roadway makes it clear a poultry operation is on 
site, but the grower has done a good job to make this site not easily accessible.  The “disease 
free area” sign at the entrance encourages protection of the live animals from accidental 
introduction of disease. 
The two propane tanks are located within 20 feet of the two chicken houses.  This 
appears to be the industry standard as heating of the poultry houses is intensely important, 
especially in the coldest days of winter.  On site visit the outdoor temperature was 28˚F.  
The propane tanks feed five heaters in each chicken house which kept the interior 
temperature at a warm 86˚F.  These tanks are less visible to visitors as they are located 
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behind four large feed tanks.  This liquid propane source could be better protected if they 
are permanently buried in the ground.   
This grower also stated his greatest fear would be loss of ventilation or heat.  This 
comment raises more concern for the location of the propane tanks outdoors.  Once this 
fuel is in the building the heating source is controlled by an automated panel within the 
chicken house control room.  This door is locked from public access.  Ventilation is also 
controlled out of this room.  The grower states that in the heat of the summer if his 
ventilation system was compromised he would notice culls within 20 seconds (Farm B 
Grower 2011). 
Contamination of the feed at this operation would also be relatively easy.  The four 
feed tanks are the first thing you see when coming onto the farm.  They are also partially 
visible from the roadway.  The feed in these tanks could be accessed by opening the 
unlocked hatch on top. 
This grower spent much time talking about how important his poultry operations are 
to his family.  His operation is responsible for much of his income to support a wife and 
three small children.  He states if his poultry operation was shut down for as little as one 54 
day cycle his family could incur serious financial burden.  When asked, this grower stated the 
greatest affect an agroterrorist could have on him and his family is economic turmoil (Farm 
B Grower 2011). 
Farm B CARVER.  Farm B CARVER results showed broilers and water supply to 
be top of the attractiveness of attack list.  The broilers at Farm B show a higher vulnerability 
than Farm A with a total score of 33.  Broilers received high scores in Accessibility and 
Recuperability, but they also received a high score in Vulnerability.  Similar to Farm A, 
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access to visitors needs to be better controlled.  While the farm is well off the roadway, it 
does share a common driveway and is surrounded by a wire fence which is open to drive 
through.  Better access control measures can reduce the access score and limit the 
Recuperability concerns.  Similar to Farm A, better constructed doors with dead bolts can 
decrease accessibility issues.  To reduce vulnerability to the broilers, CARVER suggests 
limiting access to the chicken house only to farm operators and those who will be entering 
to collect the birds.  Visitors, venders, etc. should have little or no access to the building.  
This was especially noted as the grower invited the evaluator into the chicken house with a 
live flock.  Finally, the grower should implement a stringent pest, parasite, and animal 
control program to better protect the flock. 
Watering was the second most attractive area to an attacker.  In operation this item 
was rated higher, or more attractive, than watering in Farm A.  This farm also has one well 
on site.  However, this farmer has no redundancy in his water supply.  This means if the one 
site is compromised there is no water source available to the birds.  The grower can reduce 
his vulnerability by either drilling a secondary well or bringing in an access point to the 
county water system.  Vulnerability can also be reduced by controlling public access to the 
source.   
CARVER provided the same rankings for this farm as it did for Farm A.  Those 
items which ranked the highest, or of most concern in each category are:  Criticality- feed 
storage, Accessibility- feed storage, Vulnerability- broilers, and Recuperability- broilers.  Feed 
storage is proving to be one of the most critical items in the poultry operation.  The 
CARVER results are also showing that this is the area which is most easily accessible to an 
attacker.  Additionally, broilers are the most vulnerable and would require the most time and 
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effort to replace in the operation.  These two areas will be the focus of the vulnerability 
assessment and mitigation recommendations.     
Farm C.  This farm, as opposed to the others, is located directly adjacent to the 
roadway.  Granted, this is an infrequently traveled roadway at the base of a mountain; 
however a passerby can easily see and identify all facilities in the operation.  The grower did 
discuss this area of vulnerability on site visit.  Because of the seclusion and low population in 
this area, residents can effectively police the area as a community.  The grower states a non-
recognizable vehicle on the roadway or in a driveway would be noticed within hours by the 
residents.  The grower even proclaimed that one of the residents had mentioned my vehicle 
when I pulled into the area.  While not a formal type of security, this small-town community 
policing has been effective in this area for a number of years (Farm C Grower 2011). 
The grower does not live on this property, but does own a rental home on the 
property which is currently occupied.  This rental home has full view of the two story 
chicken house and the new construction chicken house; however its view of the two single 
story houses is blocked by the adjacent structures to the dwelling house.  This house does 
provide some diversion to intruders as there is someone physically on site at night. 
The chicken houses are protected by locked, alarmed doors which could also be 
better secured with deadbolts.  The entire operation is isolated by wire fencing which does 
not provide much of a physical barrier to intrusion.  The location of the propane tanks also 
poses some risk for BLEVE damage to the chicken houses.  This risk can be mitigated by 
burying permanent tanks which may be buried.  It was also noted that there are no “disease 
free area” signs that the first two farms displayed.  These signs primarily offer protection 
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from accidental incidents rather than the intentional incidents that are of concern in this 
research.      
This farm has the same feed tanks as the first two.  However, with the larger 
operation this grower has several more tanks.  With easy access to food by opening the top, 
unlocked latch, an attacker could affect much more birds on this operation by attacking the 
feed source.  This is a widely vulnerable area among all three farms which could be easily 
mitigated by locking the feed access. 
Farm C CARVER.  Farm C CARVER results are very similar to those from Farms 
A and B.  Broilers and watering are listed as the top two most attractive items for attackers.  
However, Farm C returns watering as slightly more attractive than the broilers.  Farm C had 
an overall score between Farms A and C with summing up to a 32.  Watering received the 
highest scores in Accessibility and Recuperability.  Again this grower can limit his 
vulnerability by limiting access to the well onsite.  CARVER also recommends a filtering 
process in a secure location.  With only one well on site used by the poultry operation and 
nearby rental home, the lack of redundancy increases vulnerability on this farm.  This farm is 
widely open with easy access to the water supply.  The grower should either secure the water 
supply in a structure or implement regular security walk through so that one may not have 
uninterrupted access to the water supply.  Access can also be better controlled by 
constructing a security fence to replace the existing wire fence.  The access is lower at this 
farm because there is no dedicated driveway onto the operation. 
For broilers CARVER rated Accessibility, Vulnerability, and Recuperability high.  
This farm has several more chicken houses than the other farms with many more birds on 
farm at any time.  Accessibility issues described above can be mitigated to limit access to the 
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farm, and ultimately to the birds.  This farmer does limit visitor access well.  He only allows 
vendors to designated areas on the farm, and only his family and he are allowed in any live 
bird house.  Pest, parasite, and animal control programs can limit the vulnerability factor in 
the chicken houses.  With the large operation, and much of the grower’s annual income 
dependent upon his bird populations, Recuperability is an area of vulnerability that is more 
difficult to control.  To reduce this factor the grower needs to better secure each building to 
protect the live birds.  This grower has one new chicken house, but the rest are considerably 
older.  To decrease Recuperability concerns the grower should invest in updating security 
measures to better protect the live flock.  Improving doorways (including modern jams and 
doors) with deadbolts will help limit access to the birds.  As the operation grows, the grower 
may consider splitting his operation between two farms.  In keeping all of his flocks in one 
location he is subjecting himself to the possibility of losing the entire population in one 
attack.  This would make recuperability after the attack much more difficult. 
The CARVER rankings for Farm C are the same as the first two with watering and 
broiler production proven to be the top areas for concern in the operation.  The top ratings 
for each category are:  Criticality- feed storage; Accessibility- feed storage; Vulnerability- 
broilers; Recuperability- broilers. 
Phase 3:  Fire Rescue Capabilities Assessment 
In the final phase, a capabilities assessment was distributed to station Captains in 
Rockingham County Fire Rescue.  These Captains were instructed to fill out the 
questionnaire (Appendix C) with their entire crew.  This interview was intended to get an 
overall impression of the crew’s knowledge and understanding of incidents involving 
agriculture. 
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Two crews believed themselves to have technician level training to handle 
agricultural incidents.  This determination was made because these crews have hazardous 
materials (hazmat) technicians in their personnel.  While the technician level training will 
help them better handle the hazardous materials in the incident, this training is not specific 
to agriculture incidents.  A hazmat technician will be comfortable going down range (into a 
hot zone) to control a chemical leak.  However, they would likely not be comfortable going 
down range to take samples from infected cattle, for example.  This agriculture specific 
technician training is needed to consider a crew prepared to the technician level for 
agriculture incidents.  The majority of the crews declared either no training or only 
awareness level training.  These results show an apparent inconsistency in crew’s 
understanding of their training level for agriculture incidents.  None of the crews have had 
specific agriculture training lending us to believe the overall agriculture incident training 
within this department is either awareness level or below.  It is noted that all crews are well 
prepared for general response and hazardous materials incidents.  Crews could greatly 
benefit from [at a minimum] awareness level agriculture training so they can better apply the 
skill sets they already have. 
The 73% accuracy on the knowledge assessment was higher than expected for 
personnel with little to no training on agricultural incidents.  This assessment was designed 
to show the participant that they already have the skill set to handle these incidents; they just 
may need to better understand how to apply those skills.  The average score on this 
assessment proves that the personnel could benefit from training to help them better 
understand how to apply their skill set.  Crews could also benefit from more regular 
agriculture training on duty.  Additionally, personnel should be encouraged to complete 
operations (or higher) level training on agriculture incidents.  Once all crews have the 
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agriculture training, they should be involved in an annual exercise which may be led by those 
personnel who took the higher level courses on the topic.  After all personnel have been 
trained for agricultural incidents they should have a better understanding of how they can 
apply their previous training to these unique incidents.  
Many crews felt they did not have the equipment necessary to handle an agricultural 
incident.  This declaration supports the need for agriculture training on the crews.  In fact, 
the resources and equipment required for an agriculture incident does not extend much 
beyond what they already have on their fire and hazmat apparatus.  Additional training in 
this field will teach personnel how to use the equipment they already have to handle 
agriculture incidents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Four Potential Threat Elements were deemed unique to this research.  PETA 
received an overall score of 0.  This PTE is of little measurable threat to the agricultural 
industry.  They do not exist as a violent threat, have no intentions of using violence against 
agriculture, and have no capability of using CBRNE weapons.   PETA is not considered a 
threat. 
 Disgruntled Employees are also considered a low threat.  They do exist as a threat 
and do have a history of violence in the agricultural sector.  However, their intentions and 
targeting are not well documented (due to limited existence) and their capability to produce 
CBRNE weapons is not profound.  Disgruntled Employees should not be ignored, but 
resources should be placed on the other more serious PTEs defined. 
  Islamic extremists, the international terrorist, are considered a significant threat to 
agriculture.  They exist as a violent threat, show a history of violence involving CBRNE, and 
have intentions of using such weapons against agriculture to create a huge economic impact.  
However, there is little credible documentation on their specific planning in these attacks 
which drops their threat level to a 6. 
Finally, as we expected ALF is our top threat to agriculture.  This violent domestic 
terrorist organization has used CBRNE materials in the past and has intentions of using 
violence against those who mistreat animals or use them for human consumption/pleasure.  
ALF is actively targeting the agriculture sector and deemed a great threat.  This is the highest 
threat level possible, and is the highest level calculated in the present assessment.  In terms 
of the DOJ Risk Assessment, our Jurisdiction Threat Rating will be the highest calculated at 
a level 10.  This Jurisdiction Threat Rating was used at the end of the vulnerability 
assessment in calculating a high Jurisdiction Risk Rating. 
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Many questions cannot be answered by the facility vulnerability assessment, but this 
assessment is a good tool to generate a list of areas where the industry is doing the right 
thing to protect itself, and areas where it needs improvement.  All facilities received a 
somewhat high rating for Visibility.  This factor is inherent to the industry in this county as it 
is one of the strongest and most prevalent industries in the county.  The easiest 
improvement the industry can make is to limit their signage to reduce visibility.  If the threat 
level becomes imminent, and drastic measures are necessary, eliminate all signage.  
Nevertheless, while this is an area of vulnerability to the industry this is not an area where 
they need to focus much of their attention.  The industry can simply accept their visibility 
and focus their efforts elsewhere on how to prevent penetration within that visibility. 
 Higher Criticality and Value of Target were noted among the processing facilities 
with generally low Criticality amongst the feed mills.  The nature of the poultry industry with 
its interconnectedness (Farm-to-Fork) makes Criticality affect all sectors.  By definition 
agriculture is critical infrastructure.  It includes supply chains for feed, animals and animal 
products, crop production, seed and fertilizer production, postharvest food supply chains 
including processing, packing, and retail sales, and finally the use in food services and human 
consumption.  This vast, complex system known as agriculture will remain highly critical.  
This is another factor that the industry cannot prevent as their criticality and value are vital 
to their success (Incident Command 2008, TA4-TA5). 
 Limiting access to the target is probably the most important area that the industry 
can make improvements on.  Three individual areas were looked at under this category:  
parking, access, and air ventilation.  First, facilities should not let any unauthorized vehicles 
within 125 feet of their structure.  This distance is analyzed because it is the Bureau of 
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Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) lethal explosive blast range from an average size 
vehicle explosive (Incident Command 2008, TA35).  P1 and P2 are both located in the 
center of small towns with vehicles standoff distances less than that.  Additionally it was 
noted that P1 has an attached business with vehicles authorized to park just 45 feet away 
from the breaded pack-out and cooler area.  This facility has done well in implementing their 
own visitor parking 150 feet away, but they need to consider adjacent businesses whose 
parking they cannot control.  F1 and F2 also have open access parking lots to visitors.  While 
they are marked as tow away zones they are easily accessible by the public.  Ideally these 
facilities should have fenced parking areas with physical security.   
Personnel access is well-secured at most of the facilities.  At each facility visitors 
must physically be granted access by personnel to get into the building.  F3 had the most 
impressive access control features.  This facility was well off the road, with one entrance and 
exit which was controlled by a guard shack.  However, as noted on multiple visits, this guard 
shack was often not attended.  The infrastructure must be in place to limit access to these 
facilities, and common practice must be in place and followed 24/7 for the best security.   
Finally, air intake protection is essential to avoid aerosol type hazards.  HEPA 
filtration is ideal in the air ventilation systems; however this can be expensive and arduous to 
maintain.  At a minimum, these facilities need to protect and isolate their open air sources on 
the outside of the building.  The general public should not be able to access the air intakes to 
any of these buildings.  One idea would be to relocate all air handling equipment to the roof 
or some other location with restricted access.  A less expensive option would be to hide the 
existing air handling equipment and install visible false air intakes to divert attacker attention.         
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 Target Threat of Hazard is another area where these facilities can reduce their risk 
and vulnerability.  Unfortunately these facilities require chemicals for production, so they 
cannot eliminate vulnerability by doing away with them.  However, these chemicals need to 
be heavily guarded on the premises.  Ideally they need to be inside the facility under lock and 
key.  P2 had the highest rating in this area because they had CBRNE materials located 
outdoors.  It would be advantageous for these companies to construct a secure hazard 
containment facility. 
 Population Capacity is a factor that’s difficult for facilities to reduce their 
vulnerability.  The processing facilities have a high number of employees on location, which 
is required to keep their productivity high.  They can reduce their vulnerability by having 
more shifts with less number of people physically on duty at a time.  As stated previously, 
this industry is designed to increase productivity and profit at a low cost.  It is unlikely they 
will reduce their staff for vulnerability issues.  The staff would not be reduced as long as 
profit is high.   
 Finally, all facilities are in locations that increase Potential of Mass Casualty.  They 
are all located within small towns or cities with thousands of people within a one-mile radius 
of the facility.  There are other poultry facilities in the county which are located in largely 
rural areas.  This is the ideal location to reduce their vulnerability in terms of community 
mass casualty. 
 It was not determined that the poultry industry in Rockingham County, VA is ill-
prepared or in immediate danger of attack.  Rather, the poultry industry in this area (and 
agriculture in general) represent a newly recognized probable target; especially for terrorist 
organizations like ALF.  With the importance of the poultry industry in Rockingham County 
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and the Commonwealth of Virginia, there needs to be much attention paid to these facilities 
which are inherently vulnerable to attack. 
The primary area of concern identified in the farm assessment was Ease of Access.  
All three farms have individual access control which makes them less vulnerable.  Farm A is 
located well off the road and is not visible to the general public.   Farm B is located atop a 
hill with a difficult driveway to access including several occupied buildings to pass by.  Farm 
C is located in a very remote area of the county where the traffic is usually from the locals 
and everyone’s actions are well policed by the community.  Overall I was impressed with the 
visibility control on these farms.  However, some vulnerabilities do exist on the farms.  All 
farms had fencing surrounding the property.  This wire fence was minimal, and mostly 
served the purpose of identifying the property boundaries.  There are also no physical 
barriers to pass to get on the farm with a vehicle.  Installing a security fence and a physical 
gate at the entrance will decrease the farm’s access vulnerability.  It is understood that this 
measure may be too costly for the grower.  As a minimum I recommend installing at gate at 
the entrance to deter unauthorized vehicles from getting close to the structures.   
All of the farms had locking doors on the buildings.  This is positive, however they 
were merely a conventional door knob lock on a hallow door.  For a determined attacker this 
would pose little complication.  Replacing these doors with a solid wood or metal door with 
a mechanical dead bolt would greatly increase security.   
The two areas on the farms that proved to be most vulnerable were the broilers and 
the water supply.  The broilers are the single most important asset to the farm.  As discussed 
above, the easiest way to protect these birds is to install a better door and lock system on the 
chicken house.  Additionally, only those who absolutely need to interact with the birds 
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during the growing process should come in contact with the birds (ideally only the grower).  
Access to family, visitors, venders etc. should be prohibited unless absolutely necessary.  
This issue is especially concerning as I had growers whom invited me into the chicken house 
with live birds in grow operation.  I was not asked to follow any biosecurity protective 
measures (i.e. wash hands, cover boots/clothing etc.) before entering the structure.  If it is 
absolutely necessary these individuals shall follow a strict biosecurity protocol before 
entering the chicken house.  The Farm A Grower has the best idea to implement a wash 
in/wash out station for all visitors entering the facility.  While this is a costly addition, it’s 
one that every grower should consider in the future with growth of their operation.  
Water supply was another area of vulnerability that all growers need to evaluate.  
Most grow operations have an on-site well for a water supply.  The most prominent issue in 
the water supply vulnerability is lack of redundancy.  Only one farm had a plan for 
secondary water.  The Farm A Grower has a secondary well on-site which can be used if the 
first well is compromised.  He stated this importance in sharing the story about another 
grower whose water supply was compromised with an intentional dumping of diesel fuel.  If 
the farm only has one water supply, and that supply is compromised, a vital component to 
the bird’s life is quickly taken away.  The simple solution to this problem is increasing 
redundancy.  Growers should have immediate access to a second well or city/county water 
supply in the event that their original supply is compromised. 
One of the top fears the growers discussed was fear of losing ventilation in the 
summer and fear of losing heat in the winter.  If either of these systems were to fail, death of 
birds could occur within minutes.  Controlling access to these systems is most important.  
All farms have the controls in a locked room in each chicken house.  This room contains the 
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electrical and programming access to these instruments but does not prevent someone from 
physically tampering with them.  Securing the outdoor power supply would be the best way 
to prevent tampering with the ventilation system.  The heating system can be better 
protected by burying permanent propane tanks instead of the above ground tanks that are 
currently used. 
Finally, CARVER ranked the feed storage as most critical to the operation.  It also 
determined the feed supply to be the most easily accessible in the operation.  The feed 
storage tanks have an obvious vulnerability issue as they offer very little tamper prevention 
measures.  All growers need to better secure their feed storage.  It would be impractical to 
try and hide these large tanks or to secure them inside a building.  Therefore the growers 
need to focus their efforts on security the tanks in place.  They all declared that these tanks 
have a hatch on the top that has no locking mechanism and can be easily accessed by anyone 
who wishes to gain access to the feed.  This greatly increases the vulnerability as CARVER 
sees this area to be of high criticality as it is used daily by the birds.  Securing these tanks 
with a locking mechanism will help reduce the criticality/accessibility gap. 
Throughout the vulnerability assessments of the industry and farms a significant 
hesitation to assistance was noted.  Initially, both the industry representatives and growers 
were eager to work with researchers.  However, once the assessments were being conducted 
a hesitation arose with both.  When first speaking with the industry, representatives did not 
want the researcher to come onto property and examine security procedures.  While we 
understand it is important for them to protect their security information, their hesitation 
extended beyond protecting this information.  Industry representatives essentially shut down 
communication and would not provide anything to the researcher near the end of the 
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assessment.  A similar situation was experience on the farms.  Growers were apprehensive to 
give too much information, and 2 of 3 of the growers refused to fill out the survey.  When 
prompted to complete the survey the growers stated the survey was in too much detail and 
they felt it would make their farms look weak and vulnerable. 
Researchers met with Matt Lohr, Commissioner of the Virginia Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services (VDACS), to discuss why these representatives exhibited 
this hesitation.  Mr. Lohr states that industry and grower’s greatest fear is increased 
regulation, which will lead to increased cost in production.  They believe that academia is a 
subset of government with the power to influence increased regulation.  Growers must 
already provide an initial investment of nearly $500,000 and are only awarded small payment 
for each bird they grow.  Increasing regulation leading to increased cost can seriously 
hamper grow operations (Lohr 2011).  
This research concludes with a capability assessment of Rockingham County Fire 
Rescue.  We found several areas of vulnerability with considerable hesitation from the 
industry to make security changes.  Additionally, a gap in response preparedness exists as 
vulnerability in itself.  This makes it extremely important for our first responders to be 
prepared for these incidents.  Overall there were no broad gaps in training as most crews 
understand they would be able to use their current skill set in an agricultural incident.  There 
also appears to be no lack of equipment to handle these incidents.  Where this department 
can make improvements is to train all personnel specifically for agricultural incidents.  This 
will give them the knowledge on how to use their existing skills to compliment what they 
learn in the agriculture class to handle these incidents.  The U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security offers several mobile and resident agriculture classes free of charge to local 
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responders.  It would be encouraged that all personnel receive awareness level training 
(available online) at a minimum.  Additionally, senior firefighters and line officers should 
attend the operations and technician level training so they would be more prepared to take 
command of these incidents.  Once all personnel are exposed to some level of agricultural 
incident training they should be involved in annual skills exercises.  It would be important 
for traditional responders to work with non-traditional responders from the industry in these 
exercises.  Agriculture is extremely important to this county so fire rescue personnel should 
make it a priority to prepare themselves to respond when this asset is threatened.  
Appendix A- Abbreviation List 
(AIV)  Avian Influenza Virus 
(APHIS) Animal Plant Health Inspection Service 
(ATF)  Alcohol Tobacco Firearms 
(AVIC) Area Veterinarian in Charge 
(ALF)  Animal Liberation Front 
(BLEVE) Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion 
(BSE)  Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis 
(CARVER) Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, Recognizability 
(CBRNE) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive 
(DHS)  Department of Homeland Security 
(DOD)  Department of Defense 
(DOJ)  Department of Justice 
(ESF)  Emergency Support Function 
(ELF)  Earth Liberation Front 
(F1)   Feed Mill 1 
(F2)  Feed Mill 2 
(F3)  Feed Mill 3 
(FAD)  Foreign Animal Disease 
(FADD) Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician 
(FMD)  Foot and Mouth Disease 
(HAZMAT) Hazardous Materials 
(ICS)  Incident Command System 
(IDLH) Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health 
(KKK)  Ku Klux Klan 
(NDU)  National Defense University  
(OIG)  Office of Inspector General 
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(P1)  Processing Plant 1 
(P2)   Processing Plant 2 
(PETA) People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PTE)  Potential Threat Element 
(PPE)  Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPM)  Parts Per Million 
(USDA) United States Department of Agriculture 
(VDACS) Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 
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Appendix C- Fire Rescue Interview 
Agroterrorism Preparedness Questions- These questions will be used to evaluate your crew’s 
preparedness to respond to agroterrorism incidents.  Please use this opportunity to discuss any 
training or equipment needs to better prepare for this type of response.  
1. What is the average level of agroterrorism training on your crew? (choose one) 
None __    Awareness__    Operations__    Technician__    Advanced__ 
 
2. How often is agroterrorism training conducted on your crew? (choose one) 
Never__    Annually__    Bi-Annually__    Monthly__    Every shift__  
 
3.  Describe the type of agroterrorism training you have conducted in the last year.  
 (choose all that apply) 
None__    Informal Discussion__    Lecture__    Skills Review__    Full Scale Exercise__ 
 
4. Do you feel you have the equipment or training necessary to handle an agroterrorism incident? 
(choose one) 
Neither__    Equipment but no training__    Training but no equipment__     
Both Equipment and training__ 
 
5.  Does your crew understand their responsibilities on scene of an agroterrorism incident?    (choose 
one) 
No__    Little understanding__    Moderate Understanding__    Good understanding__ 
 
6. Describe your individual level of comfort in taking command of an agroterrorism incident.  
Would you feel comfortable taking command individually or would you benefit from joint 
command with others who may have more training/experience in this field? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7.  Describe any other concerns or needs your crew have expressed in terms of preparedness, 
equipment, or training inadequacies to respond to acts involving agroterrorism. 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.  Which one of the following preparedness categories best fits your crew’s level to respond? (choose 
one) 
LIMITED CAPABILITY- Crew requires more training and/or equipment to respond to 
agroterrorism__ 
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AWARENESS LEVEL- Crew can respond to agroterrorism as part of an initial response 
element or in support or response for the purpose of protecting nearby persons, the 
environment, and property in defensive fashion__ 
 
PERFORMANCE LEVEL- Crew can respond as part of the initial response element or in 
response for the purpose of reducing or stopping source of effects of agroterrorism 
weapons.  There must be at least one available [certified] agricultural response team available 
in the county at this level__ 
 
ADVANCED OPS LEVEL- Meet all the requirements of performance level with advanced 
knowledge of all protocols for medical monitoring of all response personnel__ 
Basic Agroterrorism Knowledge- Answer questions to the best of your knowledge with no help 
from outside resources.  Your answers will be used to develop a basic knowledge profile within the 
department.  You will not be issued any grades and your names will not be associated with individual 
answers from this section. 
1. Which of the following operations do you believe your crew may be assist with in an 
agroterrorism incident? (choose all that apply) 
Establish/Maintain ICS__  Diagnose Infected Animals__ Carcass Disposal (open air burning) __ 
Working in PPE around animals__ Agent Identification__ Decontamination (people, animals, equipment) __ 
Animal Euthanasia__  Animal Treatment__  
 
2. CBRNE is an acronym adopted by the military to identify Weapons of Mass Destruction.  
Define each class of weapon in CBRNE: 
C__________       B__________       R__________       N__________       E__________ 
 
3. Who would assume primary investigative authority in an agriculture involving suspected 
terrorism. (choose one) 
USDA__    FBI__    DHS__    FDA__    Local Police/Fire Marshall__ 
 
4. In terms of Biosecurity, is it better to establish: (choose one) 
One entrance/exit to monitor what moves on and off the farm__ 
Separate entrance and exit to prevent cross contamination__ 
 
 
 
 
5. After securing life and property, what is the first action your crew must conduct to support 
containment and investigative operations? (choose one) 
Moving all infected animals to a central location__ 
Slaughter animals to prevent disease spread__ 
Isolate and control the scene with a perimeter with physical/human barriers__ 
Begin to decontaminate all animals and equipment on farm__ 
 
6. True/False:  Agents which are used to attack animals do not affect humans so PPE is less of a 
concern. 
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7. A good area to place incident command and staging is a location near to (but not on) the farm in 
a direction that is __________ and __________ from the incident.  
 
8. True/False:  Domestic terrorists are considered one of the top threats to the agriculture industry.   
 
9. Which of the following would not be an indicator of agricultural terrorism? (choose one) 
Unusual illness or death among an entire population__ 
Unscheduled spraying outdoors, especially at night__ 
Disease presentation that’s not endemic (normally existing in that region)__ 
Unusually high death from a “common” disease__ 
None of the above, all of these are indicators__ 
10.  Most biological agents have a specified ______________ period.  This period is important to 
responders because animals may have a disease hours or days before they start to show signs and 
symptoms. 
 
11. Many argue the two top impacts of agricultural terrorism are fear of food contamination and 
potential for severe ___________ impact. (choose one) 
Economic__ 
Political__ 
Environmental__ 
Social__ 
 
12. True/False:  Because agroterrorism presents a unique and complex incident, the traditional ICS 
structure would not apply.   
 
13. Agroterrorism incidents bring many different resources including non-traditional first responders 
which may not be familiar with standard operations within fire rescue.  For this reason it is 
imperative to use ________ language with regards to radio traffic.   
 
14.  As with any potential crime scene it is important to note all observations and take every action 
possible to preserve potential ___________ for law enforcement.   
 
15. Fire rescue crews may be requested for euthanasia operations, especially crews who have engines 
equipped with ____________ which may be used for mass suffocation.    
 
16. Fire rescue crews may be requested for manpower to assist with animal _________ to help 
secure animals for testing and medication administration.  The two most widely practiced 
methods are mechanical and chemical (sedative). 
 
17. Fire crews may be requested to assist with on-site open air burning of animal carcasses.  On-site 
open air burning is often preferred because: 
It is cheaper to burn on site rather than transporting carcasses to one central location__ 
Traditional incineration facilities do not accept carcasses exposed to agroterrorism agents__ 
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Open air burning reduces the chance of groundwater contamination__ 
Disposing of carcasses on-site reduces the risk of disease spread__ 
  
18. True/False:  Biological weapons are not advantageous against agriculture because they are 
expensive and difficult to acquire.   
 
19. Which of the following would not be considered an agroterrorism attack?  
(all of these assume the political motive which qualifies a terrorist attack) 
A foreign animal disease is introduced into a population of cattle__ 
Salmonella is introduced into a salad bar at a public restaurant__ 
An incendiary device is released in a poultry plant to shut down operation__ 
ALL of the above would be considered agroterrorism__ 
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